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1

INTRODUCTION
During a midnight fishing trip on Walden Pond, Thoreau enumerates the actions of things: a
“note of an unknown bird” creaking, a thousand small perch with their tails dimpling the surface
of the pond and reflecting moonlight, Thoreau himself drifting in the “gentle night breeze,” and
an unfamiliar force vibrating along the pond as if “some life force prowling about its extremity.”
Meanwhile, Thoreau rows pulling “hand over hand” in a series of causal relations that suggest
the motions of the nonhuman agents are ontologically inseparable from his own.1 The slight
indentation on the water’s surface cannot be separated from the perches’ tails, the flash of light,
and the moon’s orbit; likewise, Thoreau’s movements become inextricable from the phenomena
of the pond at midnight. In this moment, Thoreau categorizes his actions as if they are, in Ralph
Waldo Emerson’s words, “part and particle” of the natural world;2 or what Jane Bennett refers to
as Thoreau’s “as if stance,” an instant where Thoreau “acts as if he belongs to the universe; as if
the Wilderness in him is a handsel from it.”3 Since the causal event is irreducible to any one
entity’s singular “thing-ness,” all living and nonliving entities act as active agents within the
sequence of causal relations.4
For Thoreau, thinking about causation means emphasizing the equivocation of ontotheological boundaries, such as human/nonhuman and living/nonliving, by correlating human

1

Henry David Thoreau, Walden Walden, Civil Disobedience, and Other Writings, ed. William Rossi, 3rd ed. (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 120. Here, I am using Timothy Morton’s definition of causal events “as a set of
relations between objects” in Realist Magic (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities P, 2013), 90. While Morton rejects vital
materialism as reductionists “undermining” objects, I parallel his theory with vital materialists to interrogate the
function of causal events in Thoreau’s text. See William Rossi, “Thoreau’s Multiple Modernities,” in Thoreauvian
Modernities: Transatlantic Conversations on an American Icon, eds. Francois Specq, et al. (Athens: U of Georgia P,
2013), 56-68 for further discussion of Morton’s reading of Thoreau.
2
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Over-Soul,” in Nature and Selected Essays, ed. Larzer Ziff (New York: Penguin, 2003),
207.
3
Jane Bennett, Thoreau’s Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild (New York: Sage Publications, 1994), 58.
4
My focus on active agents in causal events is based on Bennett’s material vitalism that classifies matter as “vivid
entities [that are] not entirely reducible to the context in which (human) subjects set them” in Vibrant Matter: A
Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke UP, 2010), 5.
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actions with nonhuman entities.5 While causal reasoning offers Thoreau an epistemology for
understanding the laws of Nature, the causal powers of natural objects and their (and his)
inseparability from phenomena are often unexplainable in objective terms: the loon (Colymbus
glacialis) becomes “unearthly,” the perch (Leuciscus pulchellus) “mysterious,” and even
Thoreau himself, at times, feels an unfamiliar wildness in his nature. As Thoreau traces relations
back to possible causes, his language shifts from empirical observations to imaginative
inductions and inferences that attempt to complete the insoluble causal equation. Like Branka
Arsić, I am hesitant to view Thoreau’s ideational metaphors and anthropomorphisms as mere
representations; instead, I advance a reading of Thoreau that sees his cognitive and imaginative
acts as central to his causal epistemology and ontology.6 A cognitive restructuring of ontological
boundaries between human and nonhuman occurs when Thoreau’s own motions become
entangled within a series of natural relations.7
Thoreau writes in his March 15, 1842 journal entry, “All things, indeed, are subjected to a
rotary motion, either gradual and partial or rapid and complete, from the planet and system to the
symplest shell fish and pebbles on the beach.”8 Thoreau was not alone in his examination and
theorization of the laws of motion; models of motion served as the framework for nineteenthcentury Transcendentalist metaphysics, epistemologies, and ontologies. In his essays, Ralph
Waldo Emerson shapes a world that can only be perceived in parts but consists within an ever-

5

This vital materiality, as Bennett warrants, calls forth an ontology of vibrant matter “to dissipate the ontotheological binaries of life/matter, will/determination, and organic/inorganic” in Vibrant Matter, x.
6
See Branka Arsić, Bird Relics: Grief and Vitalism in Thoreau (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2016), 7-8. Arsić’s
“literalization” considers Thoreau’s words as more than metaphors, but rather as “thing[s], capable of affecting
bodies,” 8.
7
For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus my examination of causal events on natural and anthropocentric
relations; however, as Arsić notes in “Our Things: Thoreau on Objects, Relics, and Archives,” Qui Parle: Critical
Humanities and Social Sciences 23, no. 1 (2014): 157-181 there is a case to be made for causal relations between
Thoreau and artifacts.
8
Henry David Thoreau, The Journal of Henry D. Thoreau, eds. Bradford Torrey and Francis Allen (New York:
Dover Publication, 1962), 1:332.
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moving universe that is “fluid and volatile.”9 While Emerson proposes that everything in the
universe is at a continuous state of movement and change, his contemporaries work through
similar theories of motion in the natural world. For instance, Walt Whitman writes, “All is a
procession / The universe is a procession with measured and perfect / motion.”10 Nathanial
Hawthorne echoes Emerson and Whitman in “Artist of the Beautiful” where a watchmaker tries
to discover and create perpetual motion.11 In Corresponding Motion, Catherine Albanese
describes the “Kinetic Revolution” in Transcendental thought as a “language of motion.”12
Albanese credits Emerson, Bronson Alcott, and Henry Hedge as the primordial originators of the
“language of motion” with no mention to Thoreau. But Thoreau was not absent from the
conjectures of motion and causality that served as a framework for nineteenth-century concepts
of natural science and a relation with Nature.13
The advancement in science and technology in the nineteenth century assumed that the
universe could someday be, in Laura Walls’s words, “unified under the rule of one law, a law
comprehensible to human reason.”14 The process of discovering a unifying law from the
realizable facts of the material world remained a pursuit for Romantic and Transcendental
thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic. Emerson, influenced by Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
maintained that “the universe is formed by an antecedent spirit,” “the whole can be known only

9

Emerson, “Circles,” in Nature and Selected Essays, ed. Larzer Ziff (New York: Penguin, 2003), 226.
Walt Whitman, “I Sing the Body Electric,” in Leaves of Grass and Other Writings, ed. Michael Moon (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2002), 88-90.
11
Nathanial Hawthorne, “Artist of the Beautiful,” in Nathanial Hawthorne’s Tales, ed. James McIntosh (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1987), 159-177.
12
Catherine Albanese, Corresponding Motion: Transcendental Religion and the New America (Philadelphia:
Temple UP, 1977), 70.
13
Walls testifies to Thoreau’s exposure to scientific and philosophic theories, placing Thoreau within the tradition of
nineteenth-century science in Seeing New Worlds: Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-Century Natural Science
(Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1995). See also Robert Thorson, Walden’s Shore Henry David Thoreau and
Nineteenth-Century Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2014).
14
Walls, ed., “Man Most Alive,” in Material Faith: Thoreau on Science (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1999), x.
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through reason’s unmediated and intuitive connection with spirit,” and “the spirit acts as the
organic or organizing principle to assimilate matter to its flow of energy.”15 Under the
mentorship of Emerson, Thoreau established his theory with the assumption of a higher law and
its organizing principles. Thoreau’s scientific underpinnings evolve, as Walls convincingly
demonstrates, to incorporate the empirical holist assumption that “the universe is a whole of
antecedent parts, open-ended and radically indeterminate, hence knowable only through
empirical contact.”16 Emerson’s interpretation of nature as a set of “spiritually coherent”
hieroglyphs differs little, as Lawrence Buell claims, from Thoreau’s view of natural phenomenon
as having both spiritual and material importance. It is, however, Thoreau’s “empirical and
‘scientific’ approach to nature” that distinguishes him from the other Transcendentalist
thinkers.17 While writers, like Emerson, pondered concepts of motion in the universe through
abstract reasoning, Thoreau went out into nature and examined the laws of motion and matter
firsthand to create his own “language of motion.”
Throughout Thoreauvian scholarship, there have been two conjectures of Thoreau’s
representation of nature’s materiality in texts. On the one hand, scholars approach materiality
with a Marxist and post-structuralist lens, viewing Thoreau’s accounts of nature as economic
exchanges and utilitarian commodities. Outlining Thoreau’s “economy of nature,” Richard
Grusin argues that Thoreau examines nature as a symbol of economy. Thoreau, according to
Grusin, understands nature’s economy in terms of the Marxist critique of traditional economics
and capitalism.18 In keeping with Grusin’s argument, Lance Newman observes Thoreau’s shift

15

Walls, Seeing New Worlds, 61. For more on Coleridge and Emerson’s relationship, see Robert Sattelmeyer’s and
Richard Hocks’s “Thoreau and Coleridge’s Theory of Life,” Studies in the American Renaissance (1985): 269-284.
16
Seeing New Worlds, 85.
17
Lawrence Buell, The Environmental Imagination (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1995), 117.
18
Richard Grusin, “Thoreau, Extravagance, and the Economy of Nature,” American Literary History 5, no. 1
(1993): 47.
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between idealism and materialism, suggesting that Thoreau moves toward a “materialist
understanding of nature” as he analyzes the influence of the economic, capitalist, and social
relations in Thoreau’s empirical and ontological experience.19 While traditional Materialist
discourse acknowledges Thoreau’s awareness of meaning and symbolism in matter, they
conclude that Thoreau’s experiment relies on the economy of nature, discounting the ontological
relation between human and nonhuman objects. Scholars also view motion and materialism as a
utility in Thoreau’s texts: a poetic device for constructing symbolic and metaphoric
categorizations. For Charles Anderson, the movements of wildlife serve “metaphorical or
humorous purposes” for Thoreau’s writings and provides him with “poetic imagery.”20 Nature’s
motions also emerge as a symbol for vitalism, or according to Stephen Tanner, a “sign that the
universe is alive.”21 The “current motions” of water constructs Thoreau’s view of nature’s
“organic unity” but also “reveals [his] profoundly transcendental understanding of life and art.”22
In Thoreau as Romantic Naturalist, James McIntosh also identifies Thoreau’s observations of
nature as “chaotic, various, and ever changing” but still classifiable as “a single organic world.”23
In McIntosh’s view of the Thoreau’s “shifting stance,” the movement and changes of the
landscape act as a reflection of Thoreau’s attempt to “accommodate his writing to [nature’s]

19

Lance Newman, “Thoreau’s Materialism: From Walden to Wild Fruits,” in More Day to Dawn: Thoreau’s
Walden for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Sandra Harbert Petrulionis and Laura Dassow Walls (Boston: U of
Massachusetts P, 2007), 111-5. See also Newman, Our Common Dwelling: Henry Thoreau, Transcendentalism, and
the Class Politics of Nature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Reading Thoreau’s economics, Leonard
Neufeldt, The Economist: Henry Thoreau and Enterprise (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1989); Richard Prud’homme,
“Walden’s Economy of Living,” Raritan: A Quarterly Review 20, no. 3 (2001):107-131; Judith Saunders “Economic
Metaphor Redefined: The Transcendental Capitalist at Walden,” American Transcendental Quarterly: A Journal of
New England Writers 36 (1977): 4-7; and more recently Seth McKelvey, “ ‘But One Kind’ of Life: Thoreau's
Subjective Theory of Value in Walden,” Nineteenth-Century Literature 70, no. 4 (2016): 448-472 also examine
Thoreau concerning market exchange and capitalist enterprise.
20
Charles Anderson, The Magic Circle of Walden (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 217-18.
21
Stephen Tanner, “Current Motions in Thoreau’s A Week,” Studies in Romanticism 12, no. 4 (1973): 766.
22
Ibid., 775.
23
James McIntosh, Thoreau as a Romantic Naturalist (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1974), 17.
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shifting appearances.”24 Thoreau’s representations of nature’s motions serve, in this view, as a
means for economic exchange or as a poetic device for metaphorical imagery.
On the other hand, ontological Materialists interpret Thoreau’s materiality as less of an
economic and symbolic exchange and more as a vital agent to Thoreau’s experiences and the
framework of his thought processes. Scholars, such as Robert Abrams and Branka Arsić, contest
the traditional Materialist thought by showing how Thoreau rejects notions of capitalism and
American enterprise with an ontological connection with matter. Detailing Thoreau’s resistance
to the civilization and stabilization of the American landscape, Abrams testifies to Thoreau’s
opposition to the rise of cultivated boundaries by exposing the volatile and shifting patterns of
nature. Abrams further argues that the seemingly “static” materiality transfigures into “cognitive
profiles and perspectives, and topographical features” that are constantly in flux.25 Similarly,
Branka Arsić contends that Thoreau refutes the American view of materiality as a capitalist
commodity and, rather, views Thoreau’s “things” as active agents in ontological ordering and
meaning.26 The notion of “active matter” that Abrams and Arsić convey relates to recent
conversations of New Materialism and “vital matter,” coined by Jane Bennett in Vibrant Matter.
Outlining the New Materialist movement, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost indicate the relations
between matter and immaterial “idealist assumptions,” such as “language, consciousness,
subjectivity, agency, mind, soul…imagination, values, meaning.”27 The New Materialists’
ontological approach abandons the belief that matter is an inert substance; instead, they view
matter as an active force in an integrated system, which allows New Materialist scholars to return

24

Ibid., 19.
Robert Abrams, “Image, Object, and Perception in Thoreau's Landscapes: The Development of Anti-Geography,”
Nineteenth-Century Literature 46, no. 2 (1991): 261.
26
Arsić, “On Things,” 160.
27
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., “Introducing,” in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.
25
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to the question of agential capacity in the location and structure of matter.28 In recent studies,
Materialist critics position Thoreau’s texts alongside the New Materialist approach to matter as
an active agential force that influences Thoreau’s experiences, sensations, and consciousness.
Rochelle Johnson exhibits this New Materialist approach in “‘This Enchantment Is No
Delusion’: Henry David Thoreau, the New Materialisms, and Ineffable Materiality.” Examining
Thoreau’s ontology, Johnson claims that Thoreau experiences a magnetism to the “vital force
permeating all matter,” exchange of “human and nonhuman matter,” and the sensual effect of
material causality.29 Although the New Materialists resist the notion of inert matter, little has
been said about how related causal events shape Thoreau’s epistemology and ontology.30
Like many nineteenth-century thinkers, Thoreau’s interests developed from science and
natural philosophy. He was immersed in the scientific societies, studying natural philosophy and
natural history at Harvard. “Science,” Walls writes, “was the talk of parlor and street corner,
even men of science were consolidating and elevating their pursuit into a profession.”31
Influenced by philosophers like Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, Gottfried Leibniz, and Immanuel
Kant, Thoreau and his contemporaries were exposed to a number of philosophic and scientific
concepts that impacted their own observations of the laws of nature and the universe. My first
chapter “Theories of Causality” outlines theories of causation that influenced nineteenth-century
thought and sees Thoreau’s accounts of causality as a response to a long debate about the nature

28

Ibid., 9. See Rochelle Johnson, Jane Bennett, and Branka Arsić.
Rochelle Johnson, “ ‘This Enchantment Is No Delusion’: Henry David Thoreau, the New Materialisms, and
Ineffable Materiality,” ISLE 21, no. 3 (2014): 607-8. In Passions for Nature Nineteenth-Century America’s
Aesthetics of Alienation (Athens: U of Georgia P, 2009), 3 Johnson argues that Thoreau sought a “counteraesthetics,
which assumed that the value of nature resided in its physicality, rather than in metaphors for human experience.”
30
Several scholars, such as Laura Dassow Walls and Alfred Tauber, point to motion and natural causation in
reference to nineteenth-century science and Thoreau’s epistemology while other scholars, such as Bennett and Arsić,
observe causality and assemblages or exchanges of matter in terms of Thoreau’s ontology. Causal events
themselves, however, remain a narrowly-examined facet of Thoreau’s works.
31
Walls, “Man Most Alive,” x.
29
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of causality from Aristotle’s four causes and Bacon’s inductionism to Coleridge’s Kantian
idealism and Emerson’s causal continuum. The causal debate moves from materialistdeterminist causation where an efficient cause (like God’s will) moves an entirely corporeal
universe, which can be explained in linear terms from cause to effect/effect to cause to
indeterminist causation where the efficient cause manifests in matter itself (a self-organizing
force) in which the cause-and-effect relations are constantly shifting, exchanging, and changing.
A story emerges in this trajectory of causal thought from materialist-determinist to indeterminist
causation, a narrative that influences Thoreau’s epistemological approach and ontological
relation to Nature. Natural causation, for Thoreau, acts a method of rationalizing Nature’s laws
and a theory to explain the dynamic interaction between events.32
My second chapter “The Motions of Walden” extends the causal debate and Thoreau’s
causal reasoning to a close-reading of his observations of natural causation in Walden. The aim
of this chapter is twofold: to show how language itself can inaugurate a reflection on causal
events and to demonstrate how Thoreau applies causal theories to his observations of nature,
identifying a shift from a determinist to an indeterminist approach that influences Thoreau’s
ontological relation to Nature. Following the Baconian-Newtonian tradition, Thoreau forms a
causal theory with the assumption that cause and effect act in a linear sequence whereby
inference and induction can expose the underlying variable for all the laws of nature. Thoreau’s
determinist approach shifts upon empirical contact with dynamic natural phenomena. When the
actions of human and nonhuman entities become inseparable from an insoluble web of relations,

32

I use “causation” as Kerns defines it: “Causality, or causation (the terms are used interchangeably), is a
metaphysical (or ontological) concept that refers to actual cause-and-effect relations between events or to dynamic
interactions and processes in the world,” see Stephen Kerns, A Cultural History of Causality: Science, Murder
Novels and Systems of Thought (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004), 22-3.
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Thoreau’s descriptions grow increasingly ideational and imaginative: the sandy overflow’s
animated clay, Walden Pond’s pulsating ecosystem, birds’ ethereal flight, the loon’s mystical
maneuverings. The end of this chapter will suggest that the scope of Thoreau’s causal reasoning
includes his examinations of Concord’s capitalist society and political atmosphere. In returning
attention to causal relations in Thoreau’s writings, this thesis demonstrates his contribution in,
what Albanese terms, the “Kinetic Revolution.” Positioning Thoreau alongside the causal debate
provides a new interpretation of Thoreau that views theories of motion and causality as central to
his epistemology and ontology.

10

1

THEORIES OF CAUSALITY

In his biographical sketch of Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson writes that “if he wants lyric
fineness and technical means, if he have not the poetic temperament, he never lacks the causal
thought showing that his genius was better than his talent.”33 This passage, while somewhat
acerbic about Thoreau’s poetic talent, testifies to Thoreau’s causal reasoning: “[t]he depth of his
perception found likeness of law throughout Nature” in which Thoreau “swiftly inferred
universal law from the single fact.”34 Thoreau’s “causal thought” embraced the claims of
nineteenth-century science that laws of natural causation revealed a “deeper order in the
universe,” an order with “an inherent unity with nature.”35 The nineteenth-century philosophies
that pervaded Thoreau’s intellectual society (Lyellian geology, Newtonian physics, Coleridgean
idealism, Emersonian transcendentalism) responded to a long tradition of scientific and
philosophic debates on natural causation.
The Early Modern and Enlightenment contributors in the causal debate set the groundwork
for nineteenth-century intellectual movements and shaped how thinkers considered their relation
to the movement of bodies in the material world. Two major epistemologies of causality surface
in the nineteenth-century: materialist-determinist causation and indeterminist causation.
Materialist-determinist causation maintained that the laws of nature were determined by a divine
force (Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza), the properties of bodies themselves (Hobbes), or
nothing at all (Hume). For Cartesians and mechanical philosophers, namely Descartes, Hobbes,
Spinoza, and Leibniz, matter moved from an external efficient cause whereby the motions could
be perceived in a linear, determined cause and effect apparatus. Because the causal relations

33

Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Thoreau,” in Lectures and Biographical Sketches (New York: Riverside Press, 1911),
475.
34
Ibid., 474.
35
Alfred Tauber, Henry David Thoreau and the Moral Agency of Knowing (Berkeley: U of California P, 2001), 128.
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were determinable, induction and deduction could explain the effects by their causes and viceversa. Indeterminist causation, on the other hand, resisted the notion that causality entails
physical determinism and its metaphors of nature’s motions as mechanical clockwork, which
threatened to reduce nature to mere scientific facts and did not allow space for the poetic
imagination. For nineteenth-century Romantics, the efficient cause, proposed first by Spinoza
and Leibniz, co-existed with the material and spiritual stratums: a self-organizing, creative
principle whose “external” moving force is within. The regenerative universe called forth
indeterminist causation where cause and effect could not be traced linearly but rather
encompassed a network of fluctuating and reconfiguring relations. Romanticism’s emphasis on
the intuition and imagination of causal relations led to an insight of the “deeper order of the
universe,” an understanding that could incorporate an original relation to the universe and
advance scientific discovery. For these thinkers, namely Emerson and Coleridge, materialistdeterminist methods of induction and deduction could never uncover the underlying cause of
Nature’s laws because they failed to see the universe as a self-organizing organism in continuous
flux.
Thoreau finds himself in this shifting culture of causal explanations: attracted to the
precision and accuracy of inductionism to reveal scientific facts and, at the same time, fascinated
with nature’s unpredictability and mysticism.36 And, in turn, Thoreau’s causal explanation shifts
between thinking about causality in linear, determinist terms where induction and deduction of
phenomena are possible and his realization that cause and effect cannot be predicted from the

36

Thoreau was immersed in theories of science encountered in his education, contemporaries, and personal study.
See more in Walls, A Life (Chicago: U of Chicago P), 73-75. Walls writes, “By spring 1837, Thoreau was hauling
away armfuls of Goethe, Coleridge, Victor Cousin, and, of course, Emerson’s Nature.” After leaving for a term to
teach with Orestes Brownson, Thoreau returned to Harvard and “began working through Brownson’s reading list:
the latest European literature and philosophy—Goethe and Coleridge, Heine, Cousin, Constant.”
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continuous, intangible effluence of matter. In general, Early Modern and nineteenth-century
philosophers and scientists assumed that causality could be knowable a priori and could
necessitate a logical connection in the external world, which allowed for the claim that human
reason and intuition were divinely or intrinsically interconnected with the natural and spiritual
world.37 Thoreau, too, maintains the philosophical premise that “[a]ll material things are in some
sense man’s kindred, and subject to the same laws with him.”38 For Thoreau, the universal law
(cause) ideally could be deduced by the likeness of the law (fact) in natural phenomena (effects
of the universal law). However, causal induction suggests a reductionist position where nature
becomes an object, reduced to a series of facts and systematic calculations, which does not
account for the irregularity of nature and excludes Thoreau from an unmediated relation with the
universe. His causal explanation must then maintain an Emersonian “original relation” to nature,
embrace the infinitude of nature’s flux, and allow for both the visible, sublunary and invisible,
unknown forces of natural phenomena. I argue in chapter two that Thoreau’s BaconianNewtonian inductionism leads him to reflect on relationalities that blur ontological boundaries
between human/nonhuman: a causal explanation where Thoreau’s mental and physical actions
are inseparable from the motions of nonhuman agents. Thinking about causality for Thoreau
means thinking about materiality, in New Materialist terms, as “something more than ‘mere’
matter: an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or difference that renders matter active, selfcreating, productive, unpredictable.”39 To frame Thoreau’s progression from an epistemological
Baconian-Newtonian inductionism to an ontological New Materialist vitalism, we must first

37

This premise, what Edward Craig calls the “Insight Ideal” is “the thesis that the human mind can in principle have
access to true beliefs in a way that is analogous to the way in which God can,” see The Mind of God and the Works
of Man (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1987), 38 quoted in Helen Beebee, Hume on Causation (New York: Routledge,
2006), 2.
38
Thoreau, Journal, 2:345.
39
Coole and Frost, 9.
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understand how Thoreau’s “causal thought” fits into the causal debate of Enlightenment and
nineteenth-century science.
The causal debate, for both empiricists and rationalists, foregrounded the methods of
causal explanation as a way of thinking about our relation to the physical world and the
underlying epistemologies and metaphysics of natural causation. Aligning Thoreau with either of
these ways of causal thinking, as Laura Walls puts it, “divides Thoreau from himself.”40 Walls
indicates that “the texts Thoreau was reading do not stake out simplistic positions in a debate
between eighteenth-century ‘empirical’ or ‘inductive’ reasoning and the ‘idealist,’ a priori
rationalism of the new philosophy.” 41 Equally, the causal debate Thoreau was exposed to did not
present a singular epistemology of causal explanations but a conflicted view of natural laws and
our capacity to discover them. While the scope of this project does not allow for a
comprehensive review of the causal debate and its often complicated and contradictory
trajectories, I argue that the two positions of causal explanation (materialist-determinist and
indeterminist causation) that surfaced, or resurfaced, in the nineteenth century act as a
framework for Thoreau’s scientific observation. In this chapter, I contextualize Thoreau’s
writings in A Week and his Journal alongside theories of materialist-determinist and
indeterminist causality that developed from the causal debate. I then explain how a New
Materialist reading of Thoreau’s causal reasoning offers a framework for a close-reading of
causal events Walden, which I turn to in chapter two.
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1.1

Survey of the Causal Debate
Scholastic theories of causation set the groundwork for the Early Modern and

Enlightenment epistemologies and metaphysics. The Scholastics recovered the Greek
philosophic tradition by translating and advancing Aristotelian philosophy.42 In Physics and
Metaphysics, Aristotle maintained that there were four causes that could be applied to any
explanation: the material cause (the properties), the formal cause (the form), the efficient cause
(the course of change or rest), and the final cause (the telos or end of the process).43 Francis
Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620) challenges the Scholastic’s terminology of causation,
proposing a revision to, in Kenneth Clatterbaugh’s words, “the syllogism, the concept of
substance, matter, and form…the very explanatory qualities...used by scholastic science.”44
Bacon aims to systematize the causal explanations to minimize errors in inferring the cause from
the effect. To do this, he attempts to outline the mind’s “true supports,” the empirical facts.45 The
Baconian method requires observing natural phenomena, classifying a conceptual system, and
deducing the true causal law that governs phenomena. To isolate the cause of a phenomenon, the
observer would list all the properties and order them in terms of their “effects.” By interpreting
these empirical observations, the observer could deduce the underlying cause of the
phenomenon, forming a hypothesis to be compared to other phenomena.46 For Bacon, the effect
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(or properties of phenomena) and its cause are interchangeable because when the cause is present
the effect will also be present and vice versa: “Bacon was sure that once a list of possible causes
had been prepared,” as Marie Boas Hall puts it, “the systematic elimination of those causes
would eventually yield one certain cause.”47 Bacon’s methodology suggests the possibility of a
scientific epistemology founded on empirical observations of phenomena and inductive
reasoning, a scientific method that would affect later nineteenth-century science and natural
theology.
As Bacon developed a method of scientific induction, René Descartes posed a
metaphysical approach to causal explanation with the purpose of redefining the Scholastic’s
efficient cause. Descartes’s causal principle holds that “there must be as much [reality] in the
efficient and total cause as there is in the in the effect” of that cause.48 Because the cause must
contain the properties that exist in the effect, the “causal principle states a necessary condition
for efficient causation.”49 If God’s will is the total efficient cause, how does God fit into the
scientific explanation? Because God’s will is sufficient and necessary for all effects, Descartes
maintains that the only explanation of true change is God.50 Descartes writes in Meteorology
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(1641) that “if I here explain the nature of clouds,” then “we will easily believe that it is similarly
possible to the find the cause of everything that is most admirable.” For example, if we “explain
[the rainbow’s] colors we commonly see in the clouds and in the circles which surround the
stars,” we can find “the cause of the suns, or moons, several of which sometimes appear
together.”51 Descartes implies, like Bacon, that accurately portraying and explaining facts can
lead to a hypothesis of a cause based on the facts that “sometimes appear together.” Here, he sees
understanding a phenomenon as inseparable from thinking about its causes, for “it is causes that
‘explain’ effects whereas causes are ‘proven’ from their effects.”52 In other words, this reasoning
holds that “from the effect we can (inductively) infer that the cause occurred, from the cause we
can (deductively) infer why the effect occurred.”53 From this determinist explanation, Descartes
categorizes two types of scientific inference: analysis and synthesis.
For Descartes, analysis “proceeds from effects to their causes” as a “nondeductive form
of inference” whereas synthesis “proceeds from causes to their effects” as a “deductive form of
inference.” The results of these methods differed; as Clatterbaugh defines it, “analysis is
reasoning inductively from effect to cause in order to discover new things” while “synthesis is
reasoning deductively from cause to effect in order to explain the effect which is contained in the
cause.”54 The induction or deduction must begin by searching for first causes that satisfy two
conditions: first, the causes must be clear insofar as their truth can be known and, second, a
deduction from the causes and necessary effects must show that things in the chain of relations
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are manifest.55 According to Clatterbaugh, Descartes posits that “it is epistemically necessary for
human minds to supply the ‘suppositions,’ or intermediate principles after the first principles, by
analysis or reasoning from what is known to the senses (effects) back to their causes.”56 In
Thomas Kuhn’s view, Descartes’s influence and the commitment to the assumption “that the
universe was composed of microscopic corpuscles and that all natural phenomena could be
explained in terms of corpuscular shape, size, motion, and interaction” provided a metaphysical
explanation that the universe contained “only shaped matter in motion” and a methodology
where “laws must specify corpuscular motion and interaction, and explanation must reduce any
given natural phenomenon to corpuscular action under these laws.”57 After 1630, we see this
underlying corpuscular assumption in causation theories of Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Baruch
Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, Robert Boyle, Samuel Clarke, and Isaac Newton. However, a shift
emerges in the causal debate from a solely mechanistic rationalization (Hobbes, Spinoza,
Leibniz) to a claim that causes exist in a non-physical stratum (Boyle, Clarke, Newton).
The goal for Hobbes’s causal explanation is similar to Descartes’s insofar as it attempts
to find “the shortest way of finding out effects by their known causes, or of causes by their known
effects.”58 In the Leviathan (1651), Hobbes holds that “for the universe, being the aggregate of all
bodies, there is no real part thereof that is not also body, nor anything properly a body that is not
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also part of…the universe.”59 Since mind and body are corporeal, all causal relations can be
reduced to the body itself. His theory of causation maintains that when “one body by putting
forwards another body generates motion in it, it is called AGENT [the cause]; and the body in
which motion is so generated, is called the PATIENT [the effect].”60 The efficient cause, for
Hobbes, is “the aggregate of accidents in the agent” and the patient where an accident is “that
faculty of any body, by which it works in us a conception of itself,” like if a body is at motion or
rest and its phenomenological qualities (color, heat, odor, appearance).61 Causal inference
becomes the most efficient method of gaining knowledge because it is necessary for “those that
search after science indefinitely, which consists in the knowledge of the causes of all things” to
“know the causes of universal things, or of such accidents as are common to all bodies… before
they can know the cause of singular things, that is, of those accidents by which one thing
distinguished by another.”62 Here, “the properties of the agents” are explanations of a cause and
the patient’s properties of the effects.63 Walter Ott notes that, for Hobbes, only after observing
several instances of an event to find the accidents can we “do our best to determine which
accidents of the alleged agent and patient are such that if they are present, we cannot imagine the
effect not being produced.”64 Clatterbaugh sees Hobbes as reframing the Cartesian synthesis to
include “deductive reasoning from universal principles to other principles—from cause to effect”
and an analysis to approach the process of “looking at the effect, often empirically known, and
arriving at universal or general principles.” 65 In this way, Hobbes combines analysis and
synthesis, in what Clatterbaugh calls, “a combination of empirical induction—finding the
59
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particular causes—and conceptual analysis—finding the general and universal causes.”66
Overall, Hobbes’s causal explanation relies on empirical induction to find the necessary
connection between particular causal relations and universal causes.
Benedict Spinoza likewise defends the logical necessity between cause and effect where
“[f]rom a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no
determinate cause be given, it is impossible that an effect can follow.”67 Spinoza’s philosophy
views everything as causally dependent on God because God and Nature are one and the same,
and both are constituted as the efficient cause; and, for Clatterbaugh, Spinoza “believes that the
arguments in favor of final causes, especially conceived as God’s purposes, are irrational
attempts to place all events into an anthropocentric framework.”68 By dismissing explanations of
final causation where God’s will necessitates all events, Spinoza’s explanation views God’s
nature as a triangle where “everything follows in a logical sense from that nature.”69 Jonathan
Bennett argues that “Spinoza did not distinguish what is absolutely or logically necessary from
what is merely causally necessary. In his way of thinking, there is a single relation of necessary
connection, which links causes with effects in real causal chains and premises with conclusions
in valid arguments.”70 A possible explanation lies in the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) that
assumes that “the laws and rule of nature according to which all things happen, and change from
one form to another, are always and everywhere the same.”71 Here, Clatterbaugh notes that PSR
serves two purposes: (1) “it is an assurance that the world is comprehensively causal, that is,
there exists a cause for everything,” and (2) “it is an assurance that the world is comprehensively
66
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intelligible, that is, there exists an explanation (proof or demonstration) or everything.”72 In
Ethics (1677), Spinoza aims to revise the Cartesian synthesis through a “deductive sequence of
explanations.”73 PSR unifies causation and explanation because the reason of a phenomenon’s
existence can be answered by the relevant causes. Causation then acts as a conceptual connection
whereby in conceiving causes (conceptual relations), mental and physical phenomena are
parallel: “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things”
because “knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.”74 Since
there is only one substance for Spinoza (a synthesis of God and Nature), when we explain a
sequence of substances or ideas, we must understand that the causal relation of our ideas must be
analogous to the way the substances themselves are related.
Like Spinoza, Leibniz supports sufficient reason where “there is nothing without a
reason, or there is no effect without a cause.”75 Leibniz, however, rejects the model of
materialist-determinist motion of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza where extension is external
from substance: “I do not think that substance is constituted by extension alone, since the
concept of extension is incomplete. Nor do I think that extension can be conceived in itself, but I
consider it an analyzable and relative concept.”76 Rather, substances (or monads) embody the
complete concept so that the substance itself and the concept of its properties are linked by
sufficient reason into a harmonized network—what Leibniz terms “pre-established harmony.”
While the substances are “separated from one another by their own actions, which continually
change their relations,” every monad “is a living mirror or a mirror endowed with internal
72
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question, which represents the universe from its own point of view and is as ordered as the
universe itself.”77 In Discourse of Metaphysics (1686), Leibniz explains that the complete
concept in monads “is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of
the subject to which this notion is attributed.”78 In other words, the complete concept will allow
us to deduce all the “created, active force inherent in things,” like extension, inertia, and motion.
In the explanation of monads, Leibniz separates monads into ontological categories
where “[s]ouls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and mean”
and “[b]odies act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motion;” it is in the immersion of
these “two kingdoms, that of efficient cause and that of final cause” are in harmony.79 Leibniz
contends that mechanistic states are the only method of explaining the causal sequence; however,
as Clatterbaugh notes, “the explanation stops at the ‘primitive force’ that is in each monad and
which causally carries out the blueprint or formal cause that is the individual concept.”80 In
Clatterbaugh’s view, Leibniz’s causal explanation holds that “the effect must correspond to its
cause; indeed, the effect is best recognized through a knowledge of a cause,” and “[m]oreover, it
is unreasonable to introduce a supreme intelligence as orderer of things and then, instead of using
his wisdom, use only the properties of matter to explain phenomena.”81 Here, Leibniz
distinguishes his view from Spinoza’s claim that God’s will is not necessary to the causal
explanation. Leibniz elaborates on God’s wisdom as the explanation of phenomena in On Nature
Itself (1698):
But if, indeed, the law God laid down left some trace of itself impressed on things, if by
his command things were formed in such a way that they were rendered appropriate for
fulfilling the will of the command then already we must admit that a certain efficacy has
77
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been placed in things, a form or a force, something like what we usually call by the name
‘nature,’ something from which the series of phenomena follow in accordance with the
prescript of the first command.82
If we use only the physical to explain phenomena, we will not see the true cause—the wisdom of
the orderer. Leibnizian metaphysics values the concept, the essence of a body and its causal
relations, rather than an empirical observation.83 Leibniz’s materialist-determinism of preestablish harmony follows a strictly corpuscular system; his efficient cause (“the law God laid
down”) imprints within the forces and forms of the material world and acts as a series of
phenomena that follows God’s “first command.” Boyle’s and Newton’s experiments would soon
challenge the linear, mechanized causal explanation of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.
1.2

A Turn Toward Indeterminist Causation
In a letter to Newton, Leibniz accused Newton’s theory of gravitation of using “miracles

in order to explain natural things” and “reducing a hypothesis ad absurdum.”84 Newtonian
science proved that inductions could be empirically given: observing physical effects could lead
to a discovery of invisible causes. Boyle and Newton proposed what Stephen Gaukroger calls
“horizontal causal processes, those where cause and effect were on the same level,” arguing that
the cause and effect together could be an “independent form of explanation.”85 They contended
that the causes are not restricted to the underlying properties of phenomena, and so the causes
exist in a different stratum. While “[m]echanism had been premised on the belief that all physical
behavior is the result of a single level of common causation, that of mechanically characterizable
interactions between micro-corpuscles,” Gaukroger observes, scientific experiments like Boyle’s
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investigations of “the spring of the air” and Newton’s accounts of gravitation and spectral colors
questioned a purely mechanistic rationalization.86 For Hall, Newton’s Principia (1687) claims
that “the whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in [a particulate structure of matter]—
from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to
demonstrate the other phenomenon.”87 In other words, Newton suggests universal applicability
of the phenomena of motion evident in larger bodies: the forces at work with the laws of nature,
like gravity. Newton aims to show how we are “to collect the true motions from their causes,
effects, and apparent differences; and, vice versa, how from motions, either true or apparent, we
may come to knowledge of their causes and effects.”88 Newton claims that sensible or manifest
causes, where one phenomenon is the cause of another, could only be “determined by experiment
and observation;” however, the deeper causes or intelligible causes explain “why the
phenomenal laws are as they are.”89 These causes are the real, deeper causes of phenomena and
even when they are not observed, their effects are observable and predictable. Newton writes in a
letter to Roger Cotes in 1713, that “[t]hese principles [laws of gravity] are deduced from
phenomena and made general by induction, which is the highest evidence that a proposition can
have in this philosophy.”90 Newton’s discovery that principles, or causes, can be deduced by
invisible phenomena validated the role of inferring unknown causes from an empirical
observation of materialist mechanics. Yet, the causal debate relied on a major assumption that
cause and effect acted on the material world and could be known a priori or through inductive
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and scientific methods. The role of subjectivity, the mind, and experience challenged the validity
of causal explanation to reach a higher truth.
John Locke, for example, complicates the concept of an a priori knowledge of natural
causation by questioning what kinds of things we could know. As a nominalist, Locke maintains
that human thought is but a mental construction. In contrast to the Cartesian pre-existing
concepts, Locke rejects the notion of innate ideas and posits that knowledge is determined by
experience and sense perceptions only. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690),
Locke challenges the notion of logical necessity in causation insofar as his conception of causes
and effects do not suggest a necessary connection: “The reason whereof is, that the simple idea
whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are, for the most part, such as carry with
them, in their own nature, no visible necessary connexion or inconsistency with any other simple
ideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about.”91 For Locke, our minds
are “not [innately] able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of bodies and
the sensations that are produced in us by them,” and so “we can never be able to establish certain
and undoubted rules of the consequence or co-existence of any secondary qualities.”92 While we
could “discover size, figure, or motion of those invisible parts which immediately produce
them,” we cannot know “what figure, size, or motion of parts produce by no means conceive
how any size, figure, or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of any
colour, taste, or sound whatsoever: there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the
other.”93 Locke’s causal explanation questions the Cartesian and Baconian-Newtonian causation,
where cause and effect are knowable a priori, for if knowledge is derived from sense perception,
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we cannot know the intangible cause just by observing the sensory effects. Locke’s reflection on
the limits of what we can know a priori led Hume to reject the logical necessity of causation alltogether.
David Hume maintains that causal relations are not logically necessary, and therefore,
they cannot be known a priori. He writes in an Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(1748) that the “knowledge of this relation [cause and effect] is not, in any instance, attained by
reasoning a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find, that any particular objects
are constantly conjoined with each other.”94 Hume argues that inductive reasoning and reliance
on the causal structure cannot be rationally warranted: cause and effect becomes a habit of
human thought rather than an intrinsic structure of the external world. With this thesis, Hume
challenges the notion of the Insight Ideal or what Edward Craig describes as “the thesis that the
human mind can in principle have access to true beliefs in a way that is analogous to the way in
which God can.”95 Helen Beebee views Hume as responding to two major philosophical beliefs.
First, the metaphysical belief that “nature operates in a way that is analogous to a priori
reasoning” where “the processes we see unfolding around us are causal processes, with earlier
stages linked to later ones by causal relations.” Second, causal relations are “worldly correlates
of a priori inference” where “causes necessitate their effects, or guarantee that those effects
occur.”96 While several scholars read Hume’s claims as rejecting causal reasoning and induction,
Beebee argues that Hume acknowledges that causes and effects are “mind independently
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connected in some way,” but the “nature of that connection lies beyond our cognitive grip.”97
Our observations of causal relations “can reveal no more than a succession of events which
insofar as they are represented by those impressions, are ‘entirely loose and separate’.”98
Therefore, causality can be “reduced to subjective effects and merely practical purpose.”99
Because the mind, for Hume, projects the idea of “necessary connection” onto the external
world, we cannot hold that our minds are analogous to a divine entity.
Like Hume, Kant accepts that our constitutions think teleologically about the world as a
concept for understanding mechanical explanations.100 However, Kant resists Hume’s dismissal
of a priori causal relations and famously responds with a metaphysics that offers “a complete
solution of Humean problem,” which
restores to the pure concepts of the understanding their a priori origin, and to the
universal laws of nature their validity as laws of the understanding, but in such a way that
it restricts their use to experience only, because their possibility is founded solely in the
relation of the understanding to experience: not, however, in such a way that they are
derived from experience, but that experience is derived from them, a completely reversed
type of connection that never occurred to Hume.101
For Hume, the analytic (a claim true by definition) and synthetic (empirical observations) are the
only types of knowable truths. Kant’s synthetic a priori allows for a third type of knowledge
where judgments that are necessarily true can be known to be true independent of experience: the
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assertion that every event must have a cause is, Kant argues, a synthetic a priori.102 Kant
distinguishes between phenomena (things-as-they-appear) and noumena (things-themselves);
synthetic a priori judgments occur in the phenomenal dimension. Causality then is a “conceptual
structuring of the world,” a pure concept that is independent from empirical and analytical
judgments.103 The fact that causal relations are mind-dependently determined does not differ
from Hume; however, unlike Hume, Kant’s concept of a cause “so plainly involves the
conception of a necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that
the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a
frequent association of what happens with that which precedes.”104 For example, Kant argues
that “just by the fact that [our sense] accepts appearances, also admits to the existence of things
in themselves.”105 Kant holds phenomena, like cause and effect, as realizable through the
“appearance” of “things themselves.”
In this regard, Kant also agrees with Hume that, as Keane demonstrates, “human
knowledge was limited to things as they appear to us because of our mode of experiencing them;
ultimate reality, ‘things-in-themselves,’ we can never know.”106 For instance, Kant writes in
Critique of Pure Reason (1781) that “if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective
constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects in space and
time, indeed space and time would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in
themselves, but only in us.”107 In Kant’s “two-world vision,” the knowable world of phenomena
is, in Keane’s words, “passively received but then actively ordered by forms, such as Space and
102
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Time, which are ‘in the mind,’ a priori, that is, independent of sensory experience.”108 Keane
explains that Kant’s speculative reason “reveals to us the idea of the Infinite, the Unlimited.”109
Coleridge and Wordsworth interpret the power of speculative reason as an intuitive and
imaginative mode of reaching “the Infinite, the Unlimited,” leading to Coleridge’s theories of
continuity. Romantic Kantian idealism, I argue, evokes indeterminist causation insofar that it
connects human reason with an inexhaustible and indeterminable concept of Nature and its laws.
The Romantics, influenced by German Idealism, resisted the Baconian idea, according to
Smith, that “the indiscriminate collection of facts [would] lead eventually and inevitably to the
formation of theory” because it did not allow room for “the individual human will and
imagination, while collecting and classifying ignored the relationship between natural beings,
especially human organisms and their environments.”110 Michel Foucault writes, “Descartes,
Malebranche, and Spinoza analysed [the imagination], both as the locus of error and as the
power of attaining to truth, even mathematical truth; they recognized in it the stigma of finitude,
whether the sign of a fall outside the area of intelligibility or as the mark of a limited
nature....”111 After Kant’s idealism, transnational Romanticism did not see the imagination as a
“stigma of finitude” but as necessary action of scientific methods to reach Nature’s infinitude.
Victor Cousin, Samuel Coleridge, Thomas Carlyle, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe set the stage for a New Philosophy, which drew largely from
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Romanticism.112 The New Philosophy, like Romanticism, considered poetry and science valid
approaches for exploring and explaining an organic universe and, as in Wordsworth’s “Tintern
Abbey,” a universe that could be “half-create[d]” by perception and observation.113 They
endorsed Kant’s synthetic a priori concept of causality insofar as it allowed for a subjective
experience of universal laws where the individual could use aesthetics to discover a relation to
nature and advance scientific developments. In William Wordsworth’s 1802 Preface to Lyrical
Ballads, he imagines a poet who discovers “the primary laws of our nature.”114 Genius, for
Wordsworth and Coleridge, introduced “a new element into the universe,” or at least, “the
application of powers…to produce effects hitherto unknown.”115 Reason and intuition were
necessary for scientific discovery and used to discover the laws of nature. By engaging with antiLockean Kantian idealism, Coleridge reflects on natural causation and the role of intuitive
Reason.116
Coleridge follows Kant in rejecting Hume’s argument, claiming in Biographia Literaria
(1817) that “[t]he process, by which Hume degraded the notion of cause and effect into a blind
product of delusion and habit, into the mere sensation of proceeding life (nisus vitalis) associated
with the images of the memory.”117 Coleridge’s causality, on the other hand, views the
“necessity of causal relations,” which “depend on, or rather inheres in, the idea of the
Omnipresent and Absolute: for this it is, in which the Possible is one and the same with the Real
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and Necessary.”118 Coleridge defines Nature as a “Power subject to Law of Continuity,” which
“human understanding, by a necessity arising out of its own constitution, can conceive only
under the form of Cause and Effect.”119 The “form (or law) of Cause and Effect” exists relative
to our thinking but also acts as a “form or mode of thinking” because the law is “inherent in the
Understanding itself…”120 Here, Coleridge accounts for causation as a mind-independent law of
nature (a continuous flow of relations) whereby our Reason comprehends the laws through an
apparatus of cause and effect—because Reason is the “integrated Spirit of the regenerated man,
reason substantial and vital.”121 By this logic, a chain of causal relations could be explained by “a
chain of deductions and conclusions;” however, Coleridge identifies two issues with this method:
first, “the very faculty would equally demand an explanation,” and second, “that there exists in
fact no such intermediation by logical notions, such as those of cause and effect.” If we try to
deduce the chain of causal relations, then we are presented with “the product of syllogism” and
not “the object itself.”122 Unlike Kant’s reason, the intuitive Reason held by Coleridge,
Wordsworth, and Emerson is, as Keane notes, “capable of creative insight into things-inthemselves, ultimate reality: the divine life within us an abroad.”123 Natural causation itself, and
not an explanation of causal relations through deductions, reveals the integration of Spirit and
Matter, the Absolute and Man.
Coleridge’s intuitive Reason appealed to Emerson, and in “Self-Reliance,” Emerson
writes, “a man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his
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mind, more than the lustre of the firmament of bards or sages.”124 According to Keane, Emerson
“transcends the Kantian categories of Time and Space to affirm those gleams, the reciprocal
‘power’ Coleridge says ‘streamed’ from Wordsworth when he received light: ‘…an
instantaneous in-streaming causing power’.”125 It is in this “instantaneous in-streaming” that
Emerson’s theory of indeterminist causation emerges. Albanese argues that Emerson and the
Transcendentalists resisted theological and scientific notions of causality for higher-order
thinking that transcended the limits of cause and effect rationale and “fit into the definition of
magic.”126 John Lysaker also refutes the possibility of causation as critical groundwork for
Emerson’s metaphysics: “In disclosing causality in which the very thought of causality arises,
Emerson draws the bottom out from under this would-be ontological linch-pin.”127 Causality, I
argue, serves as a framework for Emerson’s metaphysics—what Joseph Urbas terms “universal
causation.” For Emerson, the continuous flowing law of nature (“the universal causation”) is the
unifying property that makes the world “One.” Urbas positions Emerson as both a Realist and
Nominalist since “Emerson’s metaphysics easily accommodate both, as opposite poles of one
great causal and ontological continuum (however difficult the lived experience of bi-polarity may
often be).”128 In Urbas’s view, Emerson is “a causationist—that is, a firm believer in causality as
the ‘strict connexion between every pulse-beat’—every ‘trifle’—‘and the principle of being’.”129
Emerson sees reality as a causal continuum “intricate, overlapped, interweaved and endless,”—a
“web of relations” where the “relation and connection are not somewhere and sometime, but
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everywhere and always.”130 In the last lines of “Self-Reliance,” Emerson declares that “Cause
and Effect” are the “chancellors of God.”131 Causality is the governing motion—a universal
causation where “there is never a beginning, there is never an end, to the inexplicable web of
God, but always circular power returning into itself.”132 Perceiving the laws of “Cause and
Effect” then leads us to a higher unity; it awakens our intuition so that we can see the whole, “the
causes and spirits,” rather than simply the particulars.
Thoreau’s theory of causality likewise relies on the “assumption that the universe is a
whole formed by an antecedent spirit,” or a singular fact.133 Because of this “One” organizing
law of Nature, Thoreau maintains that all “nature obeys the same civil laws:” from the cosmos to
the “deepest recesses of the forest” in the “little red bug on the stump of a pine,” the shifting of
wind, and the sun breaking through the clouds.134 For Thoreau, however, “we discover infinite
change in particulars only, not in generals.”135 This discovery starts with an empirical and
phenomenological experience with the particulars of nature; for if all nature obeys the same
antecedent law as the whole universe, then observing the particulars, like “the little red bug,”
would reveal insight into the laws of Nature. In this view, the precision of Baconian
inductionism and Newtonian scientific explanation offers Thoreau a method for discovering the
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unknown particulars of nature: a posteriori facts realizable only through empirical evidence and
scientific application. He writes,
An unwearied and systematic application to nature, causes the unknown to reveal
themselves…. How many new relations a foot-ruler alone will reveal, and to how many
things still this has not been applied! What wonderful discoveries have been, and may
still be, made, with a plumb-line, a level, a surveyor’s compass, a thermometer, or a
barometer!136
The mathematical and scientific devices lead to unknown facts that cannot be uncovered a priori
without a systematic approach of measuring, surveying, and calculating. The BaconianNewtonian method lets Thoreau work from his empirical observations to reach a hypothesis
about a higher, unknown truth.
This empirical and “Baconian” method dominated nineteenth- century science and
natural theology, although labeling science as such, Walls claims, does not consider the historical
complexities of the Baconian epistemology. The general assumption that “the mere accumulation
of facts would produce scientific truth” excluded the need for hypothesis and “became so
overwhelming that the system collapsed, clearing the way for a more modern and theoretical
approach” where “facts are not facts until hypothesis gives them significance.”137 While some
like Coleridge, William Whewell, and John Stuart Mill were skeptical of Baconian induction,
they believed that without Bacon science could not have advanced and offered new readings of
Bacon’s Novum Organum.138 Coleridge argued that, without the active participation of the mind,
Bacon’s system of gathering facts cannot be considered a method of science. The “true Baconian
philosophy” then relies on “a profound meditation on those laws which the pure reason in man
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reveals to him, with the confident anticipation and faith that to this will be found to correspond
certain laws in nature.”139 Walls writes that, for John Herschel, the belief that “Bacon’s real
teaching was that natural philosophy consists of generalizing from particulars, and reasoning
from generals back to particulars” formed his 1830s “feedback loop of deductive and inductive
reasoning,” which he claimed to be “infinitely more powerful” than deduction or induction
alone.140 Like his contemporaries, Thoreau was skeptical about the Baconian-Newtonian
structures of science where induction could reduce nature to a “finite rule,” and thereby “no
longer dazzles us” or enchants us.141 “We do not learn by inference and deduction and the
application of mathematics,” writes Thoreau in “Natural History of Massachusetts,” “but by
direct intercourse and sympathy…. the Baconian is as false as any other….142 Thoreau sees, as
Coleridge does, the lack of active and personal participation from the observer in inference and
deduction. Thoreau, however, uses the Baconian-Newtonian approach in order to hypothesize on
the unknown cause of the visible effects, an act that necessitates an imaginative speculation to
complete the inference.
Perhaps, the most influential application of the Baconian-Newtonian induction for
Thoreau occurred after reading Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830). Lyell’s theory uses
induction to “trace the long series of events which have gradually led to the actual posture of
affairs.” By “connecting effect with their causes,” Lyell claims that we can “classify and retain
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the memory of a multitude of complicated relations.”143 This method would reveal “what
combination of causes analogous effects were referable; and they would often be enabled to
supply, by inference, information concerning many events unrecorded.”144 Thoreau draws on the
Lyellian inductionism in his claim that “[w]e discover the cause of all past change in the present
invariable universe.”145 By studying the present natural world, Thoreau could infer the “causes of
all past change,” a systematic approach that would, in Walls’s words, “bring to light ‘astonishing
and unexpected… connexions with past civilizations’.”146 While, in his strict Baconian method,
Lyell discouraged the study of unknown forces since visible, measurable forces were sufficient,
Thoreau’s “unwearied and systematic application to nature” insists on a study of unknown
forces.147 The fact that “we can reason so accurately, and with such wonderful confirmation of
our reason, respecting so-called material objects and events infinitely removed beyond the range
of our natural vision” prompts Thoreau to question the validity of our speculation of the
unknown in Walden: “why may not our speculations penetrate as far into the immaterial starry
system, of which the former is but the outward and visible type?”148 Newton’s method proved it
possible for Thoreau to reach the intangible laws of Nature through a phenomenal and empirical
experience.

Charles Lyell, Principles of Geology, 8th ed. (London: John Murray, 1850), 1.
Ibid., 12. Lyell’s theories largely influenced Charles Darwin. See Smith, Fact and Feeling, 95. Lyell’s geological
methods would influence Charles Darwin, who in a letter to Leonard Horner wrote: “I always feel as if my books
came half out of Lyell’s brain.”
145
Journal 1:90-91.
146
A Life, 42.
147
William Rossi identifies a tension between Lyell’s uniform change and the “Newtonian model of the continuous
and simultaneous interaction” of change in “Poetry and Progress: Thoreau, Lyell, and the Geological Principles of A
Week,” American Literature 66.2 (1994): 279.
148
Walden, 310.

143

144

36

1.3

Thoreau’s New Materialist Ontology
In his Preface to Principia, Newton writes, “I wish we could derive the rest of the

phenomena of nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am
induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which the
particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown…”149 In Walden, Thoreau offers a similar
ambition for causal reasoning; he writes that “[if] we knew all the laws of Nature, we should
only need one fact, or the description of one actual phenomenon, to infer all the particular results
at that point.”150 Since there are laws “which we have not detected,” we must view the particulars
laws to reach through “an infinite number of profiles” to find the “one form.”151 In order to infer
“the particular results” from “one actual phenomenon,” Thoreau’s epistemological approach to
observing natural causation emerges in his attempt to find regularity in the undetected laws of
nature: the underlying cause of nature’s laws and his own being. The fact that Newton’s
discovery derived from empirical observations warrants the significance of a personal, firsthand
experience with Nature, leading Thoreau to question: “How can we know what we are told
merely?...We read that Newton discovered the law of gravitation, but how many who have heard
of his famous discovery have recognized the same truth that he did?”152 Newton’s empirical
methods recognized a fact (the law of gravitation) and uncovered an unknown truth of Nature’s
law.153
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Thoreau’s empirical approach to finding natural laws can also be traced to Alexander von
Humboldt, as compellingly demonstrated by Walls.154 Humboldt follows the BaconianNewtonian tradition in Cosmos (1845) by tracing “the stream of our knowledge to its primitive
source…amid the ever-recurring changes of form, to recognize the invariability of natural
laws.”155 Finding a “knowledge of the chain of connections, by which all natural forces are
linked together” becomes Humboldt’s aim in observing physical phenomena. His empirical study
leads to, what Wall’s terms, an empirical holism in which “a harmonized whole [] emerged from
the interconnected detailed of particular natural facts.”156 Humboldt’s description of the relation
between the “harmonized whole” and “interconnected details” evokes indeterminism, even
though it strives for invariability. For instance, Humboldt writes in his introduction to Cosmos,
“Nature considered rationally, that is to say, submitted to the process of thought, is a unity in
diversity of phenomena; a harmony, blending together all created things, however dissimilar in
form and attributes; one great whole animated by the breath of life.”157 Here, Humboldt’s
harmonized whole does not seem to have a linear, determinable structure; instead, his idea of
unity entails a “blending together,” an “inextricable net-work of organisms by turn developed
and destroyed” amidst “the universal fluctuation of phenomena and vital forces.”158 Studying the
network of organisms “leads us to the entrance of new labyrinths” and “vague intuition of the
mysteries to be unfolded.”159 Here, Humboldt’s network of fluctuating organisms and vital forces
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aligns with an Emersonian web of relations, which continually create “new labyrinths” for the
intuition to explore. Humboldt approaches this inextricable web of fluctuations and forces
through “a more intimate knowledge of the connection existing among all phenomena.”160 In this
sense, Humboldt’s writings shift from an materialist-determinist approach of “intimate
knowledge” to an indeterminist perspective of unceasing vital forces and entangled phenomena.
Similar to Humboldt, Thoreau uses a Baconian-Newtonian method to create an apparatus
for inferring the materialist-determinist causal relations in Nature but finds that the qualitative
relation between cause and effect cannot be so easily determined in the dynamic ecosystem of
the Concord Woods and Walden Pond. Instead, Thoreau’s determinist causal inference leads to a
reflection on indeterminate series of causal relations, where the causal actions of nonhuman and
human entities become inseparable from one another.161 Vital materialist (or New Materialist)
theories offer a productive framework for literary analysis in the trajectory of Thoreau’s causal
thought because, like Thoreau, they find that causality requires a more complex understanding
than the materialist-determinist causation model. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost credit the
Newtonian model of physics (mechanical physics) for offering a way “to examine the interactive
relationship between bodies and the forces that act upon them” and to develop a “science of
forces and movements that are less obviously material yet from which matter is inseparable.”162
New Materialists, however, reject the claims of materialists-determinist causality where
“material objects move only upon an encounter with an external force or agent, and they do so
according to a linear logic of cause and effect” and “predictable forces.”163 Instead, they argue
160
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for a more complex understanding of causality: “new materialists are rediscovering a materiality
that materializes, evincing immanent modes of self-transformation that compel us to think of
causation in far more complex terms; to recognize that phenomena are caught in a multitude of
interlocking systems and forces and to consider the location and nature of capacities for
agency.”164 The laws of nature are viewed as unpredictable because “there is no longer a
quantitative relationship between cause and effect,” and “[f]or any emergent material
configuration, infinitesimally small causes can transform successive conditions for interaction
among elements such that they end up having massive but unanticipated effects.”165 In Karen
Barad’s agential realism, for instance, “[c]ause and effect emerge through intra-actions,” or a
necessitation of bodies to participate in action (“causal enactments”) with one another—to
understand things and forces as constantly changing, exchanging, diffracting, and interacting
inseparably as “matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is iteratively enfolding into its ongoing
differential materialization.”166 Causal relations, however, “cannot be thought of as specific
relations between isolated objects; rather causal relations necessarily entail a specification of the
material apparatus that enacts an agential cut between determinately bound and propertied
entities within a phenomenon.”167 In agential realism, objects and beings are not separable and
objectified; there are constant exchanges and changes occurring. Our attempt to understand the
phenomena through the phenomenological body becomes an apparatus (a structure to measure an
outcome) and makes a cut in the agencies (exchanges and changes) to identify an aspect of the
phenomena that can be imagined within the apparatus as an object/being/body and an other; this
“agential cut” comes from the “marking or specific materializing ‘effect’ identifies the agency of
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observation as agentially separable from its ‘cause’ (the ‘object’) within the phenomenon.”168
Unlike the Cartesian cut that attempts to “disentangle” the phenomena, the agential cut provides
“a contingent resolution of the ontological inseparability within the phenomenon hence the
conditions for…description: that is, it enables an…account of marks on bodies, but only within
the particular phenomenon.”169 Bodies are then perceived as nodes in space-time: assembling,
connecting, congealing, exchanging, reconfiguring.
Intra-activity introduces a “new sense of aliveness” where the “world’s effervescence, its
exuberant creativeness, can never be contained or suspended.”170 Thoreau, too, seems to see a
new sense of aliveness in the movement of bodies. In an 1851 journal entry, he writes, “The
earth I tread on is not a dead, inert mass. It is a body, has a spirit, is organic, and fluid to the
influence of its spirit, and to whatever particle of that spirit is in me.”171 He resists seeing “events
as merely material—wooden—rigid—dead” and acknowledges that “we actually inform with
them little life by which they live.”172 When Thoreau applies Baconian-Newtonian methods and
attempts to determine forces as predictable, he does not find a qualitative relationship between
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cause and effect but phenomena “caught in a multitude of interlocking systems and forces,”
where the motions of human and nonhuman entities become inseparable.173 Underlying
Thoreau’s causal epistemology and ontology is the belief that all material in the universe obeys
the same law, an antecedent motion in all material: “The hardest material seemed to obey the
same law with the most fluid, and so indeed in the long run it does.”174 Like Emerson’s
“universal causation,” Thoreau’s theory holds that the continuous flowing laws of nature are the
unifying property that makes the world “One.” Thoreau writes,
The first cause of the universe makes the least noise. Its pulse has beat but once—is now
beating. The greatest appreciable revolutions are the work of the light-footed air—the
stealthy-placed water—and the subterranean fire. The wind makes the desert without a
rustle. To every being consequently its own first cause is an insensible and inconceivable
agent.175
This passage echoes Emerson’s metaphors of causality as a “strict connexion between ever
pulse-beat” and the “principle of being.”176 Here, Thoreau’s first cause continually pulses
through natural elements: its pulse is the “work of the light-footed air,” “the stealthy-placed
water,” the “subterranean fire.” Every being after the “first cause of the universe” cannot trace its
cause back through the pulsations, so its “own first cause is an insensible and inconceivable
agent.” Because “Nature is continually original – and inventing new patterns,” the first cause
cannot be conceived as it is derived from an endless series of pulsations—shifting relationalities
between objects: the “overhanging pine” dropping into the water, the “sun and wind rubbing it
on the shore” and wearing its boughs “white and smooth” to “assume fantastic forms.” 177 We
can read this passage through Barad’s causal intra-actions where “bodies differently materialize
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as particular patterns of the world as a result of the specific cuts and reconfigurings that are
enacted.”178 For Thoreau, these relationalities cannot be traced through an inductive or deductive
method because Nature continually creates new patterns.179 Thus, Thoreau writes, “Cause and
effect are equally evanescent and intangible, and the former must be investigated in the same
spirit and with the same reverence with which the latter is perceived.”180 Thoreau claims that the
“essence” of the phenomenon comes from this “evanescent and intangible” flow of cause and
effect: “the essence which at the same time perceived the effluence.”181 Causality becomes the
essence of the phenomenon—or if, as Barad argues, the primary ontological units are
“phenomena—dynamic topological reconfigurings/ entanglements/ relationalities/
(re)articulations,” we can interpret the effluence of “Cause and Effect” as an ontological unit.182
Cause and effect are dependent modes of explanation that must be studied with the “same
reverence,” and so the causal event becomes an epistemological site of causal explanation along
with an ontological site where Thoreau must place his actions within the web of causal events.
This unpredictability in natural phenomena renders an agency and vitalism to nonhuman entities
where the action (a cause or effect) of a single entity is inextricable from its relationalities—from
the entire causal event itself.
In the following chapter, I argue that these shifts in Thoreau’s causal thinking expose
moments of cognitive restructuring of ontological boundaries between observer/observed and
human/nonhuman. As the qualitative relation between cause and effect becomes insoluble in
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Baconian-Newtonian methods, Thoreau uses imaginative inferences and poetic ideations to make
meaning of the causal event where nonhuman and human entities are inseparable from their
series of causal relations. Just as vital materialists linger on “moments during which they find
themselves fascinated by objects, taking them as clues to the material vitality that they share with
them,” I argue that we can locate moments in Thoreau’s texts where he is fascinated by
nonhuman entities and their actions, textual clues where the “sensory, linguistic, an imaginative
attention [turns] toward a material vitality.”183 Because indeterminist causal events cannot be
reduced to a single entity’s actions, all living and nonliving material entities become active
agents—an interplay of agentic forces—within the series of cause and effect.
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2

THE MOTIONS OF WALDEN

In an April 18, 1852 journal entry, Thoreau records a series of observations: a flock of birds
flying and landing in the water; ducks grazing in the field; a thistle springing up in the grass;
geese crackling and flying overhead; the willow catkin expanding; a sucker floating on the
meadow. The actions of the phenomena of the lake lead Thoreau to reflect on the series of
events:
Why should just these sights & sounds accompany our life? Why should I hear the
chattering of blackbirds—why smell the skunks each year? I would fain explore the
mysterious relations between myself & these things. I would at least know what these things
unavoidably are – –make a chart of our life—know how its shores trend—that butterflies
reappear & when—know why just this circle of creatures completes the world.”184
To explore the relations “between myself & these things,” Thoreau acknowledges the need for a
theoretical system that could chart and calculate natural occurrences.185 In this passage, he
speculates that a systematic epistemology of nature’s progressions would yield a method of
exploring the “mysterious relations” between things and inferring regularity in nature from these
relations. In Walden (1854), Thoreau would develop this earlier theoretical requirement for
exploring the enigmatic, inexplicable relations—relations that he finds unavoidably inseparable
from himself. The inseparability of things from a network of causal connections calls into
question the ontological difference between “myself & these things.” As I demonstrated in
chapter one, Baconian-Newtonian inductionism offered Thoreau an accurate and precise method
of calculation and prediction to explore the unknown laws of Nature. By observing causal
relations as linearly determined, Thoreau could infer an underlying “cause,” or a singular fact,
from the regularity in empirical “effects” of natural phenomenon. This materialist-determinist
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approach to causation becomes a framework for Thoreau’s imaginative inferences or figurative
renderings of the “mysterious relations” that sees human and nonhuman entities as vital agents in
an indeterminist series of causal relations.
Thoreau’s causal reasoning becomes apparent in his attempts to measure the “deepest part of
the pond” in “The Pond in Winter.” Following the Baconian-Newtonian scientific tradition,
Thoreau gathers empirical evidence by observing the particular facts of Walden Pond. By
“sounding through the ice” to determine the shape of the pond’s bottom, Thoreau “could
calculate the variation for each one hundred feet in any direction.”186 Thoreau explains his
progression of thought from his detected calculation to its theoretical applicability:
Having noticed that the number indicating the greatest depth was apparently in the centre of
the map, I laid a rule on the map lengthwise, and then breadthwise, and found, to my
surprise, that the line of greatest length intersected the line of greatest breadth exactly at the
point of greatest depth…. I said to myself, Who knows but this hint would conduct to the
deepest part of the ocean as well as of a pond or puddle? Is not his the rule also for the
height of mountains, regarded as the opposite valleys?187
Thoreau develops a conceptual system in which he deduces a causal law that governs the
phenomenon and infers a hypothesis that can be compared to other phenomenon: “Given, then,
the length and breadth of the cove, and the character of the surrounding shore, and you have
almost elements enough to make out a formula for all cases.”188 Finding regularity and
conformity in his calculations of Walden Pond, Thoreau contemplates the possibility of a causal
epistemology. If we could access the knowledge of regularity and uniformity in “all the laws of
Nature,” then, by observing its patterns through the occurrences of the effect following its cause
(“one fact, or the description of one actual phenomenon”), we could anticipate the causal
relations in nature (“infer all the particular results at that point”). He illustrates this point by
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applying the same formula to measure the depth of White Pond, and then, to the depths of human
character for an anthropometric-like inference drawn from the “one fact,” or the “rule of two
diameters.” Thoreau’s systematic effort to find the “deepest part” affords a way “to infer [a
person’s] depth and concealed bottom” by drawing “lines through the length and breadth of the
aggregate of a man’s particular daily behaviors and waves of life into his coves and inlets” and,
by finding in the line’s intersection, uncover “the height or depth of his character.”189 Like his
causal theory, Thoreau seeks to find the underlying cause (a person’s depth) by observing the
effects (series of daily behaviors). For his epistemology to hold true, Thoreau’s “one fact” can be
inferred for “all the particular results” in both human and nonhuman phenomena.
This universal causal reasoning is but an ideal in Thoreau’s empirical observations, for “we
know only a few laws, and our result is vitiated, not, of course, by any confusion or irregularity
in Nature, but our ignorance of essential elements in the calculation.”190 Our conceptions of “law
and harmony” are confined to the few laws constituting our knowledge of the “essential elements
in the calculation,” but the still-more-wonderful harmony results in “a far greater number of
seemingly, conflicting, but really concurring, laws, which we have not detected.”191 Although
Thoreau acknowledges the epistemic limitation of nature’s laws, he accepts the determinist
approach where laws can infer “all particular results” if we could only know all the laws of
nature. In the next line, the determinist epistemology recedes into the endless fluctuation of
nature, imperceptible to the bounds of perception: “The particular laws are as our points of view,
as, to the traveller, a mountain outline varies with every step, and it has an infinite number of
profiles, though absolutely but one form.”192 We cannot perceive the harmonization (the “one
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form”) except through our shifting and fragmented “point of view” of nature, which appears in
“an infinite number of profiles.” Thoreau’s reference to the “infinite number of profiles” evokes
an indeterminist view where the laws of Nature cannot be linearly determined due to the shifting
relations. This passage exhibits the interdependence of these two frameworks of the causal
debate where Thoreau’s reflection on the effervescent causal relations first depends on his causal
epistemology that attempts to linearly trace cause-and-effect by inferring particular laws from the
detected material motions of nonhuman and human entities. Finding these laws becomes a
pursuit of Thoreau’s observations and epistemological framework to experience knowledge
through the particulars of the material world.193 For Walls, Thoreau tests this theory by
“reach[ing] through the particulars to the single law that organized them into a harmonious
whole,” shifting from a “passive recorder to an active seeker.”194 The particular, as Michael
Jonik holds, “is bound up with how we can perceive it within its tangle of relations.”195 Thoreau
tests his theory (“all the particular results” can be deduced from “one actual phenomenon”) by
locating “the particulars” of a phenomenon within “tangled” causal relations of human and
nonhuman motions.196
Thoreau does not find a “particular result” but rather finds himself in a universe made up of
causal connections: a continuous interchange of matter, motion, and contact. The empirical
experience of indeterminist causation challenges the assumptions of the Baconian-Newtonian
method and, as he views causal relations of the material world, Thoreau realizes that there is no

193

Thoreau’s attention to the particulars of the material world acts as a primary framework for his epistemology. As
Tauber demonstrates, “Truth was to be found in the actual process of seeing, it would be discovered in the
particular, for the particular’s own sake,” 99.
194
Seeing New Worlds, 36.
195
Michael Jonik, “ ‘The Maze of Phenomena’: Perception and Particular Knowledge in Thoreau’s Journal,”
Thoreauvian Modernities: Transatlantic Conversations on an American Icon, eds. Francois Specq, et al. (Athens: U
of Georgia P, 2013), 205.
196
Walden, 195.

48

single phenomenon; instead, a single spatiotemporal phenomenon—a moment of interplay
between space, time, and matter—contains simultaneous events that are contiguous in space and
time.197 In Karen Barad’s definition of “agential realism,” for example, she claims that
phenomena “do not merely mark the epistemological inseparability of observer and observed, or
the results of measurements; rather, phenomena are the ontological inseparability of agential
intra-acting components.”198 If the primary ontological units in Thoreau’s texts resemble causal
relations between entities rather than entities themselves, how could our views of his ontology
change? When Thoreau observes the “enfolding phenomenon” of causal relations, the domains
of the interior of his mind and exterior of the material phenomenon “lose their previous
designations.” Thoreau does not have an “exterior observational point,” rather he becomes “part
of the world” by his entanglements in the causal motions of nature’s materiality.199 Walls
testifies to Thoreau’s ontological engagement in nature by describing his observations and
perceptions of nature’s heterogeneous parts: moments “where man and nature were at every level
dependent on and expressive of each other, and the ‘facts’ of nature were energetic coproductions of the human mind operating with and within the field of natural objects.”200 My
close-readings of causal events present a cogent case for Thoreau’s ontological relation to nature
insofar as they accentuate the interdependency of human and nonhuman actions.
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2.1

Writing Relationalities: Language and Cognitive Acts
To claim that natural causation yields an ontology, we must first ask how language itself

inaugurates such reflections on causal relations and the agency of natural objects. How does the
connection between words enact the relation between material objects and phenomena? In one
sense, we could say that meaning and words offer an “ontological condition” where, as Stanley
Cavell argues, “our meaning a word is our return to it and its return to us—our occurring to one
another—is expressed by the word’s literality.”201 This transfer from our meaning to the word’s
and back becomes relational to the literal expression of the word. Cavell’s literality, according to
Branka Arsić, means that “words have to find their way back to things: emerging out of
imprints—a novel phenomenon generated by encounters with beings and things—they
themselves have to become ‘events’.”202 Sharon Cameron holds that figurative language in
Thoreau’s Journals raises “a question of how part of a phenomenon is related to the whole of
that phenomenon or to another phenomenon.”203 Thoreau’s “series of impression,” for Cameron,
most clearly “refers to the connection of a phenomena with itself…and to the conjunction of one
phenomena with another.”204 In this view, an objective description of things is an effort to
“writ[e] nature” in a way that “subordinates human presences” while necessitating a reflection on
the connectivity between natural phenomena.205 Walden’s descriptions simultaneously
subordinate human presences foregrounding the phenomena itself and involve human presences
within causal relations as if to write human actions into nature’s phenomena. With these
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frameworks, Thoreau’s language functions in two ways: (1) words themselves, bound by
material objects and actual events, become a phenomena derived from and always returning to
material objects and occurrences, and (2) a series of observations reveals the relationalities
between phenomena and necessitates a reflective response concerning causal relations. In his
description of causal events (or series of causal relations), Thoreau’s figurative language works
both as a way to question nature’s relation to itself and as a thing itself (an entity acting within
the causal event).206
If we define causal events as “set[s] of relations between objects,” these relations must
also be realizable within Thoreau’s accounts of nature.207 In “Brute Neighbors,” Thoreau
questions these relations between objects, “Why do precisely these objects which we behold
make a world?”208 How are objects (the antecedent parts) causally connected to the whole (the
organic, self-organizing universe)? How do we perceive the objects as causally connected insofar
as they logically necessitate an interconnected system? Thoreau’s descriptions of causal events
attempt to answer these question by fixing objects, and their actions, within a series of causallyconnected events. In other words, an object’s essence (its singular “thingness”) cannot be
thought of as separable from the causal event: or, in Thoreau’s words, “the essence which at the
same time perceived the effluence.”209 Thoreau’s enumeration of causally-connected phenomena
must show a certain type of relation between objects, an action that connects one occurrence with
another occurrence whereby the first causes the second, and the second depends on the first; and,
although the causal event cannot always be determined in these linear terms, the event still
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contains evident causally-connected interactions.210 Causal events occur in the text when actions
foreground the description, rather than the objects themselves. Take for example the passage
from Thoreau’s midnight fishing trip in “The Ponds” where a series of actions drives the
description: bird creaking, perch dimpling the surface of the pond, and Thoreau pulling hand
over hand.211 Because the event cannot be reduced to a single entity’s “thingness,” the event
becomes figurative and ideational, or in Thoreau’s words “cosmological.” Thoreau does not
provide a scientific or even a specific name for the “unknown bird,” “mysterious nocturnal
fishes,” and “some life prowling” about the extremity of the pond. The objects themselves
become undefined by their own properties, and instead, they are defined by their effect on and
their material agency within the entire causal event. Thoreau’s presence, his actions of rowing
and drifting, do not constitute as outside of the causal event but intertwined with the nexus of the
pond’s agentic materiality.
Thoreau’s ideations and imaginative acts do not invalidate his scientific theories since,
Walls notes, the Coleridgean-Emersonian “poet uses the results of science and philosophy, and
generalizes their widest deductions.”212 William Whewell’s Philosophy of Inductive Science
(1840) clearly articulates this premise held by nineteenth-century rationalist idealism. Jonathan
Smith states that Whewell “rejected empiricist claims that scientific knowledge was ultimately
based on sense perceptions, arguing that fundamental ideas like causation, polarity, and
substance are necessary truths essential to making empirical ‘facts’.”213 For Whewell,
“materialist explanation does not really explain, in the sense that they leave unresolved the
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mysteries of the human mind, of human origins, of humanity’s relation to the universe.”214 This
post-Kantian, rationalist idealism appears in Thoreau’s assumption that “we are provided with
the senses as well fitted to penetrate the spaces of the real, the substantial, the eternal, as these
outward are to penetrate the material universe.”215 Just as our outward senses “penetrate the
material universe,” the material world incorporates our active Reason and sense perception.
Thoreau, like Whewell, suggests a logical necessity in causation that presupposes the making
empirical facts; he perceives in “the common train of [his] thoughts a natural and uninterested
sequence, each implying the next, or, if interruption occurs, it is occasioned by a new object
being presented to my senses.” It is in the “unaccountable transition” that we can move from a
“common sense view of things” (objects presented to sense perception) to an “infinitely
expanded and liberating one” (a perspicacity of the thing-itself): “from seeing things as men
describe them, to see them as man cannot describe them.”216 The “roving mind” can reach a
space “where distance fails to follow, and law, such as science has discovered, grows weak and
weary” because it “knows a distance and a space of which all those sums combined do not make
a unit of measure,—the interval between that which appears, and that which is.”217 The mind
itself seems to be the “unit of measure,” a systematic tool to find the interval between Kant’s
noumena (thing as it is) and phenomena (thing as it appears). Thoreau, like Emerson and
Coleridge, sees the mind as capable of creative insights into things-in-themselves and the divine
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laws of Nature. However, Thoreau’s approach to these creative insights differs from Emerson
and Coleridge, for we can “apprehend the sublime and noble only by the perpetual instilling and
drenching of the reality that surrounds us.”218 Natural causation, then, is mind-independent to the
extent that it exists in the material world and can be knowable a priori, for intellect “discerns and
rifts its way into the secret of things,” but we can only realize the laws by an inundation of
empirical, a posteriori facts.219
While perceiving natural causation can reveal an inherent harmony in nature’s laws, the
limitation and subjectivity of perception also complicate this premise.220 The “shifting profiles”
of our point of view assumes that we can only apprehend the external world through our own
subjective conceiving.221 To what extent do Thoreau’s perceptions and cognitive acts create
causal events? Scholars, such as James Reid, H. Daniel Peck, and Frederick Garber, address this
question by considering the nature of Thoreau’s perceptions and cognitive faculties to reflect on
relationalities and make meaningful connections. Nelson Goodman’s hypothesis on epistemic
inductions and “worldmaking” claims that the act of understanding cannot be separated from
cognitive creativity: “Perceiving motion, we have seen, often consists in producing it.
Discovering laws involves drafting them. Recognizing patterns is very much a matter of
inventing and imposing them.”222 Goodman suggests that “all worldmaking consists of taking
apart and putting together” while at the same time “composing wholes and kinds out of parts and
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members and subclasses, combining features into complexes, and making connections.”223 James
Reid extends Goodman’s theory to include Stanley Cavell’s terms, “Walden’s wording of the
world,” or the poet’s “remaking” of a world, where facts exist “because there is a meaningful
world, a site where facts cross because they’ve been significantly placed.”224 Possible worlds
hold meaning because “we read figurative events extravagantly and momentary encounters
expansively.”225 For Jonik, it is through the “poetic perception [that] we dwell with particulars,
in the affinitive web of living relations in such a way that these relations can become significant
poetic perceptions”—an act of “imaginative cocreation and cocommunication of and with the
living world.”226 The imaginative work of worldmaking, then, entails locating meaningful facts
(the objects that make the world) and co-creating relations between the particulars (the poetic
perception of the world). H. Daniel Peck understands Thoreau’s imagination as an act of creating
categories that take shape as the “products of ranging observations and associations,” and in
result, Thoreau is constantly creating categories and then placing his own relational associations
within the observation: “Relations are always perceived, by Thoreau, within categories—within
predetermined, cognitive frameworks. These are embracing designs, the structures, in which
creativity proceeds. If ‘phenomena’ are perceived relations between natural objects, then
Thoreau’s categories are clusters, coherent aggregates, of phenomena.”227 According to Peck,
Thoreau seeks a “structure to contain his exploration of phenomena,” or in my analysis, a
discernable causal relation in the laws of nature.228 Peck defines “phenomena” through the
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reordering of material structures where Thoreau creatively reconfigures the world into plausible
categories and relational associations. Frederick Garber sees Thoreau’s imagination as “visual
and kinesthetic” where his “activity of locating ha[s] to be put into graphic, physical terms.”229
For Garber, Thoreau’s consciousness constantly shifts as if running through “a series of
interlocking mirrors which takes him from the observations of external nature to the deep
recesses of the self and then out again.”230 Like Peck and Garber, I consider Thoreau’s ideational
and perceptual acts as actively reordering relations and observations that locate himself in the
natural world. In my view, however, Thoreau’s ideations seek to categorize causal relations by
perceiving relational associations of natural phenomena; and, by reordering the material
structure, Thoreau’s cognitive actions become a part of the fluctuating and reconfiguring
materiality of indeterminist causation. It becomes difficult to separate the actual phenomena—
the material causality—with Thoreau’s cognitive categorizations that measure himself with those
motions.231
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the possible complications attached to Thoreau’s
causal epistemology and the interaction between his empirical observations and nature. First, this
view, as Walls puts it, “assumes that ‘phenomena’ are, as [Thoreau] put it, not independent of us
but related to us, and that our knowledge can exist only in that shifting field between ourselves
and our ‘objects’.”232 Second, it also supposes that causal events are an inherent structure of the
objective world, and by using causal inductions and cognitive acts, Thoreau enters into (or
becomes entangled) with natural phenomena. Our purpose is then twofold: first, we must
229
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understand this shifting relationship between “subject and object,” “seer and seen,” and discover
how Thoreau’s accounts of causal events become agents for interconnectivity between natural
phenomena and Thoreau’s subjective experiences, cognition, and inductive reasoning. Second,
we must accept that this relationship, the inseparability of nonhuman and human entities within
the causal event, can be realized through his imaginative inductions and inferences:
anthropomorphisms, metaphors, and poetic diction that interrogate the imprint of one object on
another. Thoreau’s imaginative inferences do, for my purpose, demonstrate the importance of the
“widest deductions” of causality and materiality, relations between human and nonhuman
entities, and nature’s laws. I suggest that viewing Thoreau’s figurative language as causal
inductions and relative cognitive phenomena, instead of mere symbols, helps approximate
Thoreau’s epistemological and ontological relation with the material world and laws of Nature.
2.2

Causal Thought in Walden
Thoreau’s causal theory applied in “Spring” as he observes “the forms which thawing

sand and clay assume” when the “one hillside illustrated the principle of all the operations of
Nature.”233 If we read this causal phenomenon according to his epistemology, then Thoreau first
needs to describe one actual phenomenon. Heat thaws the frost causing sand to flow; the sand’s
flows resemble “locinated lobed and imbricated thalluses of some lichen;” the sands show
various shades of “iron colors;” and the forms of the streams change from semi-cylindrical to
“fat and broad.”234 These configurations of empirical, scientific facts form an actual
phenomenon; or what Thoreau terms, “creation of an hour,” a phrase that indirectly references
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the visions of Charles Lyell on which Thoreau’s theory bases.235 The objective catalog of the
causal series becomes increasingly vibrant as the sandy matter emanates an “excess of energy”
within its designs. “I feel as if I were nearer to the vitals of the globe,” Thoreau writes, “for this
sandy overflow is something such a foliaceous mass as the vitals of the animal body.”236
Acknowledging the sandy overflow’s agency within the causal event, Thoreau formulates the
second part of his theory with an attempt to “infer all the particular results at that point.” Thoreau
holds that the essence of the substances, their vitalism, anticipates the form of other material
things: “You find thus in the very sands an anticipation of the vegetable leaf.”237 In other words,
the actual phenomenon of the “very sands” anticipates the result: a single law that organizes
nature.238 Thoreau continues, “No wonder that the earth expresses itself outwardly in leaves, it so
labors with the idea inwardly. The atoms have already learned this law, and are pregnant by it.
The overhanging leaf sees here its prototype.” If the causal powers—the agency of entities in
causal relations—observed in the sandy overflow is the one fact, and the one fact manifests in
atoms, then Thoreau could “infer all the particular results at that point.”239
For his causal inference to hold true, Thoreau must show how a fact can truly infer the
particular results of the overhanging leaf along with other living entities. Turning toward a
mereological inquiry, Thoreau scrupulously classifies the semiotics of entities in “the globe or
animal body.” The leaf becomes a prototype for “feathers and winged birds [that] are still drier
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and thinner leaves” and “ice [that] begins with crystal leaves,” even the “whole tree itself is but
one leaf, and rivers are still vaster leaves and towns and cities are the ova of insects in their
axils.”240 He also positions the human body as a “prototype” to situate human agency and causal
power: “What is man but a mass of thawing clay?” Blood vessels become branching streams, the
ball of a finger a drop-like point, the ear lichen (umbilicaria), the lip (labium), the nose
“congealed drop or stalactite,” and so on. Gradually, Thoreau’s morphology transposes
nonhuman entities onto the human body, attempting to answer his question: “Is not the hand a
spreading palm leaf with its lobes and veins?” Thoreau extends the one fact inferred from the
sandy overflow from nonhuman to human entities as if he can extrapolate the underlying essence
of a singular law. Yet, Thoreau “know[s] only a few laws, and [his] result is vitiated;” he again
encounters the ambivalence in “the infinite number of profiles.”241 It “seemed” like the hillside
exhibited “the principle of all the operations of Nature,” but Thoreau finds that “there is no end
to the heaps of liver lights and bowels.”242 Instead of finding the one unifying law, this passage
identifies a series of “unexpected relation[s]” where, as Reid puts it, “all things blend curiously
together.”243
Even the language itself blends together various ways of classifying and measuring—
sounding like, in Michel Imbert’s words, a “mock philology, wildcat etymology, nonsensical
fantasizing rather than erudite, well-grounded ‘scientific’ lexicology.”244 Thoreau’s
amalgamation of lexicology, I argue, experimentally extends his causal theory to the institution
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of language. 245 The letters materialize as if they too are in motion and inextricable from the
causal event of the sandy clay: “radicals of lobe are lb, the soft mass of b (single lobed, or B,
double lobed,) with liquid l behind it pressing it forward.”246 The material substances of the lobe,
soft mass, and liquid have a sort of causal relation to the lb, b, and l, which seem to act like
causal powers pressing the mass forward. The assemblage of things that make up the world
(Thoreau’s hypothesized law, organic substance, language itself) becomes an ontological unit of
the phenomena, inseparable from the intra-acting components and entangled in Thoreau’s poetic
observations. Just as his wording reconfigures lexical mereological systems, human and
nonhuman matter entangles into a mass of vital entities, a “living poetry” and “living earth.”
Just as the sandy overflow becomes increasingly vibrant, a dynamic ecology of Walden
emerges in “The Ponds.” To introduce his record of causal events, Thoreau uses a second-person
plural presence (a collective, universal “you”), a rhetoric choice that both sees the observation as
a universal truth and guides the audience through a series of facts that occasion a causal
explanation: “When you invert your head, it looks like a thread of finest gossamer stretched
across the valley,” “[y]ou would think that you could walk dry under it,” “you survey its surface
critically.” His reader, the collective you, follows a progression from a seemingly determinable
phenomenon (a surface as “smooth as glass”) to an indeterminable series of motion where a
dynamic scene interrupts the seemingly motionless waters: “where the skater insects scattered,”
“a duck plumes,” a “swallow skims,” “a fish describes an arc,” a thistle-down floats on the
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surface, the fish dart, the water dimples.247 The reader’s assurance of a motionless, predictable
observation of the pond quickly dissolves into a plenitude of motion: a list of actions that
decenters the earlier perception. The following lines uncover a singular fact (a description of one
phenomenon) emerging from the causal agency of the nonhuman entities: “for not a pickerel or
shiner picks an insect from this smooth surface but it manifestly disturbs the equilibrium of the
whole lake. It is wonderful with what elaborateness this simple fact is advertised.”248 The
passage then turns to elaborate on the ways in which the “simple fact” manifests in actual
occurrences, like how the water-bug’s ceaseless movements furrow the “water slightly, making
conspicuous ripple bounded by two diverging lines.” A study of the cause-and-effect relations of
the water-bugs and undulated water heralds a figurative meditation on indeterminist causation;
Thoreau proposes that “[n]ot a fish can leap or an insect fall on the pond but it is thus reported in
circling dimples, in lines of beauty, as it were the constant welling up of its fountain, the gentle
pulsing of its life, the heaving of its breast.”249 The “constant welling up” and “gentle pulsing”
evokes the Emersonian causal continuum where the cause-and-effect relationship cannot be
linearly determined because “Nature continually repairs” and “continually receiv[es] new life
and motion.”250 Because Thoreau has identified this singular fact, he can, as purported by his
epistemology, infer the particular results. 251
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In Walden Pond’s “seemingly bottomless water,” Thoreau can extend the detected laws
of causal relations to the pond’s imperceptible realms, and in the process, hypothesize the
possible relations of unseen objects.252 Thoreau continues to envision causal relations beyond
what is visible with an induction guided by his prior knowledge of the observed relation between
the skater insects and the swallow with the sun. His use of the modal “may” signals a possible
correlation between the supposed fish and the current causal event: “It may be that in the distance
a fish describes an arc of three or four feet in the air, and there is one bright flash where it
emerges, and another where it strikes the water….”253 Predicting the causal relation, Thoreau
imagines the possibilities of unseen entities physically interrelating with the visible phenomenon.
Often, Thoreau’s figurative language acts as a causal inference, drawing a conclusion about a
causally-connected event based on the observed “effect” and the supposed “cause.” Thoreau’s
figurative language shows what Bennett calls “a refined sensitivity to the outside-that-is-insidetoo,” an attempt to see the vitality of the nonhuman entities of nature through his own vitalism.254
For example, in Thoreau’s encounter with the battle of the ants in “Brute Neighbors,” he inserts
an explicable, anthropomorphic cause (“a war between two races of ants”) imagining the ants’
movements in relation to a human battle “as if they had been men.”255 Thoreau never discovers
the “cause of the war,” but instead, through his imaginative rationalities, places himself within
the actions of the ant war, even allowing the phenomenon to influence his affective sensations to
feel as if he “had [his] feelings excited and harrowed by witnessing the struggle.”256 Thomas
Pughe notes how anthropomorphic tropes and notions of personhood demand—what Marc
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Bekoff terms—“cognitive empathy.”257 These tropes encapsulate “our inevitably intermingled
and interdependent relations with other animals.”258 The ant war becomes an epistemological site
for Thoreau’s causal inference but also an affective site where his empathetic response situates
himself within the ant’s battle, “inevitably intermingled” as part of the movement. Like the
objects themselves, Thoreau’s physical actions and figurative interjections become part of the
causal event, inextricable from the actions of the nonhuman entities.
Thoreau’s imaginative rationalizations often occur in his observations of the oscillation
of birds. In Bird Relics, for instance, Arsić refers to birds in Thoreau’s writings as “ontological
borderers,” claiming that birds “cross thresholds between visible and invisible, being and nonbeing.”259 Birds, for Arsić, become an embodiment of an ontology in which Thoreau’s life “is
imagined as a line that endlessly moves without ever forming a fixed shape; a constant flight that
doesn’t stabilize itself into a formal identity.”260 How might we view the ontological boundaries
of birds in relation to his causal reasoning—Thoreau’s observation of their visible “effect” and
the invisible “cause”? Thoreau cannot visually distinguish the efficient cause of birds’ motions
except through a reflection of birds’ actions and reactions. The causal equation is missing a
variable that Thoreau must reconcile through the categorization and ordering of his perception.261
Unlike the previously-mentioned cases, Thoreau does not attribute this imperceptible cause to an
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anthropomorphic vitalism but rather correlates the birds’ intangible motions with the mysticism
and wildness of nature.
Pausing from the laborious plight of his “Bean-Field,” Thoreau observes the presence of
a nighthawk who “circled overhead in the sunny afternoons” and becomes absorbed in the fluid
and ethereal motions of the nighthawks’ “graceful and slender like ripples caught up from the
pond, as leaves are raised by the wind to float in the heavens,” witnessing the “kindredship” in
nature.262 In this moment, Thoreau notes the causal relationship between the nonhuman entities
of nature (the birds) and a natural occurrence (the wind). While a causal relationship may not be
tangible to Thoreau’s visual perceptions, he cognitively reorders the phenomenon to comprehend
the relationship of the visible, natural matter and the invisible, indiscernible source of motion.
Again, Thoreau’s account pauses to elaborate on the causal event: the birds’ soaring, descending,
approaching, leaving, swooping, singing. The birds’ motions become “ripples,” and the hawk
becomes the “aerial brother of the wave,” who answers to the “elemental unfledged pinions of
the sea.” The flight of the birds (the one actual phenomenon) extends to other organic substances
with metaphors of water and the sea. Thoreau’s amalgamation of birds and watery motions
attempts to unveil the singular law that organizes all of nature; and, like the sandy clay passage,
Thoreau must insert an aspect of his own being into the “prototype” of the actual phenomenon.
Just as the hen-hawks circle “in the sky, alternately soaring and descending, approaching and
leaving one another,” Thoreau places the actions of his thoughts within the phenomena of the
birds “as if they were embodiment of [his] own thoughts.”263 His thoughts become inseparable
from the causal event; the perceived phenomena and Thoreau’s imaginative expositions of birds’
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causal relations to the material world become as Peck states, “coherent aggregates” of the
phenomena, or causal inductions that form within the causal structures of nature.264
Causal events often point to unexplainable causes and emphasize the ambivalence
between ontological boundaries between nonhuman and human entities. The phenomenon can
only be explained in metaphysical terms: the events become Wild, uncanny, and mysterious.265
Bennett details Thoreau’s encounter with Wildness as moments when “[o]rdinary matter now
appears marvelous to him, something whose very existence is inexplicable.” It is through an
enchantment of the Wild that Thoreau “discern[s] the awesome infra/intra/extra-human world of
matter.”266 In Realist Magic, Timothy Morton defines causality as “an uncanny moment that
happens in front of the encrypted objects, when a strange object perturbs a domain that has
achieved a necessarily, structurally false ontic familiarity.” 267 In other words, causality occurs
“in front of” objects, meaning “the way that objects talk to one another, apprehend one another,
and comprehend one another,” and with objects that are “both themselves and notthemselves.”268 Theories of causality then can be seen “as a desperate attempt to normalize this
uncanny state of affairs.”269 Often, Thoreau’s awareness of causal events provokes a meditation
on the “uncanny state” of the causal relations themselves. For instance, reflecting on his
midnight fishing trip, Thoreau writes, “It was very queer,” referring not to an actual example, but
the phenomenon itself during the nights “when your thoughts had wandered to vast and
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cosmogonal themes in other spheres.”270 Thoreau himself admits not to the queerness of his
cosmogonal thoughts, but to the queerness of the whole causal event itself. The causal event
takes the shape of the sublime or uncanny where the fish are “mysterious” and the vibrations
“uncertain.” Perhaps, the most evident example of this type of causal inference appears the
encounter of the loon in “Brute Neighbors.”
The loon’s motions, or what Peck refers to as a “dance between subject and
object…between self and nature,” also becomes a “dance” between Thoreau’s visual and
imaginary distinctions of causality in the loon’s “maneuvering.”271 Thoreau follows the loon to
“see how he would manoeuver,” testing the relations between his actions and the motions of the
loon: asking himself, how will the loon react to my presence and my movements towards his
location? This question encourages Thoreau to consider the causal relation between “subject and
object,” and the boundary between “visible and invisible;” his perception constantly shifts from
the tangible causal relation of the loon’s actions to an unexplained, “unearthly” causality of the
loon’s existence. Thoreau enters into a “game,” trying to calculate the loon’s appearances and
striving to “divine [the loon’s] thoughts against [his own].” Here, Thoreau studies the loon to
anticipate the possible effects using a time-order relationship: “He dived again, but I
miscalculated the direction he would take, and we were fifty rods apart when he came to the
surface this time, for I had helped to widen the interval.”272 He testifies to the difficulties of
identifying causal relations through physical movements; in a game, thoughts become the causal
agent for the player’s action, but their thoughts can only be estimated by empirical observations
of their actions. In the same way, Thoreau tries to dictate the loon’s thoughts by an examination
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of its actions. While Thoreau categorizes this experience as “man against loon,” he places
himself as a “player” with the loon—his cognitive process acting as if he were the loon in order
to find the cause of the loon’s appearances.
While Thoreau occasionally glimpses “ripples where [the] loon approached the surface,”
they do not substitute the variable needed to predict the loon’s motions; in fact, the loon’s actions
become progressively less tangible as “not wit could divine where in the deep pond, beneath the
smooth surface, he might be speeding his way like a fish, for he had time and ability to visit the
bottom of the pond in its deepest part.”273 Conceiving the loon’s unseen location, Thoreau
imagines the bird entering into the ethereal and, for him, unfathomable depth of the pond. What
starts as an examination of the “loon (Colymbus glacialis)” and the explicable cause of his
appearance at Walden Pond (“[the loon] came, as usual, to moult and bathe in the pond”) turns
into Thoreau’s conception of the loon’s actions as “wild,” “unearthly,” and “demoniac”—
“perhaps the wildest sound that is ever heard [at Walden].”274 The causal event becomes
otherworldly and Wild. His new categorization of the loon shifts his perception of the changing
material surroundings “as if [the loon’s] calling from the east and rippled the surface, and filled
the whole air with misty rain,” imagining the loon’s “prolonged howls” as the cause for the
atmospheric effect of the pond’s material configuration. Because of the unpredictable, and often
times unseen, motions of the loon, Thoreau ineffectively measures himself with the loon unable
to create a world where the loon’s actions reveal the laws of nature. For Walls, the “independent
action of the loon reopens the void between them, and through the void rushes chaos—the
wild.”275 In my view, this chaos between Thoreau and the loon is a product of causality: when an
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unexplainable object, returning to Morton’s definition, “perturbs a domain that has achieved a
necessarily, structurally false ontic familiarity.”276 The loon’s “infinitely various, nonrepeating
but patterned phenomena,” as Walls claims, provide Thoreau with an understanding that “the
chaos of wild nature was not meaningless or void, but information which he could process into
meaning.”277 Thoreau uses meaningful facts to reach through the causal relations of Walden to
understand his ontology; and, by processing the “chaos” of indeterminist causation, Thoreau
finds his motions conjoined with the infinite, patterned phenomena. Thoreau’s causal reasoning
extends to the movements of economic and political systems—networks of relations where the
inseparability of human and nonhuman (the individual and these systems) is equally as insoluble,
uncanny and Wild. By conflating human and nonhuman actions, Thoreau signals to a political
ecology that sees all entities as having causal efficacy, an interdependence that demands an
ethical accountability.
2.3

Economy, Politics, and Ethical Accountability
Thoreau’s approach to natural phenomenon parallels his examination of the human

environment: economic frameworks, social customs, and collective action. Thoreau, according to
Newman, “applied a natural historian’s habit of mind—empirical observation and materialist
analysis—to the social and political life of Concord, Massachusetts,” and “[as] a result, he saw
that capitalism actively managed the relationship between humans and nature by organizing
labor according to the economic frameworks of property and profit.”278 At Walden, Thoreau
witnessed the rapid effects of the global marketplace with the introduction of the railroad and
steam-powered ships. Local labor, products, and market exchanges were now displaced for a
276
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more wholesale economic exchange, making it difficult to distinguish the outcome of labor and
the source of products.279 Take for example Thoreau’s commentary when purchasing a garment
from his tailoress:
‘They do not make them so now,’ not emphasizing the ‘They’ at all, as if she quoted an
authority as impersonal as the Fates. . . . When I hear this oracular sentence, I am for a
moment absorbed in thought, emphasizing to myself each word of it, that I may come to
the meaning of it, that I may find out by what degree of consanguinity. They are related to
me, and what authority they may have in an affair which affects me so nearly.
Thoreau introduces an insoluble causal relation between they and me whereby an unknown,
removed agent “affects [Thoreau] so nearly” in his individual affairs. His semiotic inquiry, the
parsing of each word, attempts to expose meaning in the words themselves that signal a “degree
of consanguinity” in the remoteness of the causal relation. Similar to the example in “Spring” of
the sandy overflow, the economic system becomes a complex set of relations that blend together,
or in Cavell’s words, economy “turns into a nightmare maze of terms about money and
possessions and work, each turning toward and joining the others”: words like “profit and less,
rich and poor, cost and expense, borrow and pay, owe and own, business, commerce, enterprises,
ventures, affairs, capital, price, amount, improvement, bargain, employment, inheritance,
bankruptcy, work, trade, labor...”280 In this unceasing flow of economic jargon and processes,
Thoreau strives to locate his relation to the complex web of economic exchanges, carving
through the capitalist excess to find the essential laws for the economy of living.
In “Economy,” Thoreau’s economic experiment relies on a deduction of “the gross
necessaries of life” from the luxuries of industrial living, which would uncover “the essential
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law’s of man’s existence.”281 To do this, Thoreau does not detach himself from the economic
system but deliberately conducts market exchanges that will preserve human’s “vital heat”
through “Food, Shelter, Clothing, and Fuel.”282 For example, he lists the materials used for his
shelter, noting the surplus: boards, shingles for roof and sides, two second-hand windows, one
thousand old bricks, two casks of lime (“That was high”), hair (“More than I needed”), mantletree iron, nails, hinges and screws, latch, chalk, transportation.283 The inventory shows a causal
relationship between the items on the list and his economy of living—the fact that he could live
on the items listed. Thoreau then provides a literal deduction of the “gross necessities” to
determine his whole income:
Deducting the outgoes, . .
there are left . . . . .

$23 44.
14 72½
$8 71½

The calculated number reflects Thoreau’s deliberation of “the importance of man’s soul” remote
from “the success or failure of the present economic and social arrangements.”284 In “The BeanField,” Thoreau deliberately participates in agricultural labor and market exchanges by “planting,
and hoeing, and harvesting, and threshing, and picking over, and selling them,—the last was the
hardest of all,—I might add eating them, for I did taste.”285 This series of actions serves as an
economic experiment more than a source of food. Thoreau writes, “Not that I wanted beans to
eat, for I am by nature a Pythagorean, so far as beans are concerned, whether they mean porridge
or voting, and exchanged them for rice.”286 Even though Thoreau strives to “simplify” his
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relation to the marketplace, the rapidly changing economic system cannot be conceived in such
simple measures of mathematical deductions and agricultural experiments: “It is a labor to task
the faculties of man—such a problem of profit and loss, of interest, of tare and tret, and gauging
of all kinds in it, as demand a universal knowledge.”287 Without a universal law, an extrapolation
of the results of human faculties seems incomprehensible to determine. This passage calls to
mind Thoreau’s causal reasoning in “The Pond in Winter” where a universal knowledge of all
the laws would allow for an inference of “all the particular results.”
The indeterminate “human faculties” calls forth a similar reflection of causally-connected
social customs and collective actions. If we could “work and wedge our feet through the mud
and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, and appearance” (or in other
words, find the effect following its cause), we could plant a “Realometer,” or realize a true
understanding of reality where we deduce the higher organizing law of the “shams and
appearances” that have accumulated over time.288 As Newman notes, Thoreau “acknowledged
the need, not just for individual self-reform, but also for collective action in pursuit of wholesale
social change…. He believed that not just our ideas, but also the socioeconomic relationships
that shape our lives on the land, must be changed if we are to achieve a just society in a healthy
environment.”289 Thoreau’s causal reasoning then elicits a political and moral philosophy
whereby individual actions are held as accountable “causes” to the collective “effect.”290 In
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“Slavery in Massachusetts,” human acts become like “the odor which the plant emits.”291 The
inseparability of the “odor of [human] actions” and “the general sweetness of the atmosphere”
necessitates a causal moral philosophy: because “all odor is but one form of advertisement of
moral quality,” we may measure the sweetness (morality) of our actions by the scent (effect) they
dispel into the atmosphere. An individual’s actions and morals are inextricable from the political
and social atmosphere and, therefore, demand an ethical responsibility: an intentional
“sweetness” of actions. Again, like the midnight fishing trip, we see Thoreau’s underlying
premise that human actions are inseparable from the causal relations in natural phenomena, along
with social and political environments.
When “[w]e are independent of the changes we detect,” the less we perceive their motions,
and for Thoreau detecting “the slowest pulsation” is vital to a realization of the essential laws
and their relation to natural, anthropological, and economical phenomenon.292 In this chapter, I
have indicated moments in Thoreau’s Walden that focus on “the slowest pulsation” and attempt
to trace a phenomenon’s cause back through a series of pulsations: a causal continuum of
material reconfigurings. While observing the enfolding causal continuum, Thoreau’s actions
becomes entangled in the phenomenon since his actions cannot be separated from the nonhuman
entities within the causal event. Thoreau’s ideations give these events, borrowing Barad’s words,
“new sense of aliveness,” an “exuberant creativeness” in the vital agency of nonhuman entities
and the Wild, uncanniness of causal events. By the same token, Thoreau supports a realization of
anthropological environments whereby human actions are inseparable from the collective
economic, social, and political systems, and thus, necessitate an ethical responsibility to
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contemplate the causal import of individual actions. Thoreau’s inability to separate himself from
the capitalist and political systems becomes sort of an uncanny event in its remoteness, or an
unidentifiable efficient cause for the economic exchanges and social atmosphere.293 The premise
for Thoreau’s philosophy derives from this consciousness of motion and conscience of actions.
Thoreau holds that “[w]e are not wholly involved in Nature” when “[b]y a conscious effort of the
mind we can stand aloof from actions and their consequences; and all things, good and bad, go
by us like a torrent.”294 A relation with Nature then requires a “conscious effort of the mind” to
stand within “actions and their consequences.” In Walden, Thoreau guides readers through an
epistemological method of detecting, calculating, and inferring “the slowest pulsations” to
establish an ontological relation to Nature—a process of becoming in the enfolding causal
relations of dynamic materiality.
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CONCLUSION
During his Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, Thoreau envisions the progression
of a canal boat hidden by fog, a picture that “impressed with us a sense of weight and irresistible
motion.”295 Thoreau uses the same adjective “irresistible” to describe a boatman’s action of
“stooping his shoulder to the pole, then drawing it back slowly to set again” and its effect of the
boat “moving steadily forwards through an endless valley.” In the conjoined contact of human
motion with the river’s current, Thoreau imagines that the boatman “feels the slow irresistible
movement under him with pride, as if it were his own energy.”296 In a sense, “irresistible”
defines an enchantment and magnetism (or in Thoreau’s words, “something impressive, even
majestic”) immanent in the entangled motions of human and nonhuman entities.297 If causal
events reveal an inseparability between human and nonhuman actions, then “irresistible motion”
could also mean an inexorableness: an inability to reduce any one entity to a singular action (a
cause or effect) since all entities are active agents in a series of causal events, as in Thoreau’s
journal entry, “All things are, indeed, subjected to rotary motion.”298 Thoreau’s close attention to
the causal relations leads to a heightened awareness of anthropocentric actions and their effects
on the environment: to question what it means for human’s actions to be inseparable from the
motions of nature.
Thoreau’s drastically-changing New England environment demands further awareness of the
relation between human and nonhuman actions. For instance, the presence of the railroad looms
in the background of Walden, necessitating a new understanding of motion. Thoreau writes,
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“When I meet the engine with its train of cars moving off with planetary motion,—or, rather, like
a comet, for the beholder knows not if with that velocity and with that direction it will ever
revisit this system.”299 Here, Thoreau alludes to Newton’s first law of motion where if no force
acts upon an object, then the object will not experience a change in its motion; and so, Thoreau’s
train stays in motion with a constant speed and direction until it ascends into another stratum.
Meanwhile, the train’s motion lingers in the local, planetary landscape of Walden Pond, and
Thoreau conceives that even the “fishes in the pond” feel the rumbling. Walls suggests that the
railroad brought more than just new vibrations to Walden Pond, but it signaled a new geological
epoch that geologist today call the Anthropocene, or “when fossil fuels put global economies
into hyperdrive.”300 Massachusetts’s shifting landscape called upon the eye of natural historians
and scientists to question the possible effects of these changes.301 Thoreau responds to this call in
his causal theory: his attempt to infer causes from effects and find regularity in nature so to
anticipate the results of nature. Perhaps, his scientific, Baconian-Newtonian study of nature
would uncover an essential fact that would anticipate these results, and by inductive practices,
we could be more intentional about our actions and interactions in the natural and social
environment.
In this process, Thoreau uncovers not a singular fact but a series of relations, “an
inextinguishable vitality in Nature.”302 Thoreau sees all the entities as more than just moving
bodies but active agents in the causal event. In Jane Bennett’s political ecology, seeing bodies as
“more than mere objects” offers an ethical and political aim where “a new found attentiveness to
matter and its powers will not solve the problem of human exploitation or oppression, but it can
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inspire a greater sense of the extent to which all bodies are kin in the sense of inextricably
enmeshed in a dense network of relations. And in a knotted world of vibrant matter, to harm one
section of the web may very well be to harm oneself.”303 For Thoreau, causal events
demonstrate, perforce, a relationality along with a necessary ethical accountability. By extending
his causal reasoning to human vitalism, Thoreau recognizes the inextricable imprint of his
actions on the dynamics of Walden’s ecosystem. The Wild and uncanny emerge in the
inseparability of Thoreau’s physical motions and mental processes from causal relations, a
realization that cultivates reverence for the nonhuman agents that surround him.
Thoreau recognizes the sine qua non of wildness: “We need to tonic of wildness…we
require that all things be mysterious and unexplorable, that land and sea be infinitely wild,
unsurveyed and unfathomed by us because unfathomable.”304 If Thoreau knew “all the laws of
Nature” and their causal relations, would the predictability of nature’s motions cause a division
between him and the natural world? The “mysterious and inexplorable” events of nature
presuppose a desire to search for the organizing principle: to live deliberately with nature and its
laws. His wading in the marshes, to seek the tonic of wilderness, becomes entangled with the
lurking of “the bittern and meadow-hen,” booming “of the snipe,” building of the solitary fowl’s
nest, and crawling of the mink. The “infinite number of the profiles” of the mountain outline in
“The Pond in Winter” occasions the opportunistic remark in “Spring,” “We can never have
enough of Nature.”305 Here, Thoreau delights in the unknowable wildness and variability of
causal relations, considering his epistemological endeavors “to explore and learn all things” as an
essential component of Nature.
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